Model-based influences on humans' choices and striatal prediction errors.

The mesostriatal dopamine system is prominently implicated in model-free reinforcement learning, with fMRI BOLD signals in ventral striatum notably covarying with model-free prediction errors. However, latent learning and devaluation studies show that behavior also shows hallmarks of model-based planning, and the interaction between model-based and model-free values, prediction errors, and preferences is underexplored. We designed a multistep decision task in which model-based and model-free influences on human choice behavior could be distinguished. By showing that choices reflected both influences we could then test the purity of the ventral striatal BOLD signal as a model-free report. Contrary to expectations, the signal reflected both model-free and model-based predictions in proportions matching those that best explained choice behavior. These results challenge the notion of a separate model-free learner and suggest a more integrated computational architecture for high-level human decision-making.

Differentiable neural substrates for learned and described value and risk.

Studies of human decision making emerge from two dominant traditions: learning theorists [1-3] study choices in which options are evaluated on the basis of experience, whereas behavioral economists and financial decision theorists study choices in which the key decision variables are explicitly stated. Growing behavioral evidence suggests that valuation based on these different classes of information involves separable mechanisms [4-8], but the relevant neuronal substrates are unknown. This is important for understanding the all-too-common situation in which choices must be made between alternatives that involve one or another kind of information. We studied behavior and brain activity while subjects made decisions between risky financial options, in which the associated utilities were either learned or explicitly described. We show a characteristic effect in subjects' behavior when comparing information acquired from experience with that acquired from description, suggesting that these kinds of information are treated differently. This behavioral effect was reflected neurally, and we show differential sensitivity to learned and described value and risk in brain regions commonly associated with reward processing. Our data indicate that, during decision making under risk, both behavior and the neural encoding of key decision variables are strongly influenced by the manner in which value information is presented.

Neural mechanisms of belief inference during cooperative games.

Humans have the arguably unique ability to understand the mental representations of others. For success in both competitive and cooperative interactions, however, this ability must be extended to include representations of others' belief about our intentions, their model about our belief about their intentions, and so on. We developed a "stag hunt" game in which human subjects interacted with a computerized agent using different degrees of sophistication (recursive inferences) and applied an ecologically valid computational model of dynamic belief inference. We show that rostral medial prefrontal (paracingulate) cortex, a brain region consistently identified in psychological tasks requiring mentalizing, has a specific role in encoding the uncertainty of inference about the other's strategy. In contrast, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex encodes the depth of recursion of the strategy being used, an index of executive sophistication. These findings reveal putative computational representations within prefrontal cortex regions, supporting the maintenance of cooperation in complex social decision making.

Choosing to make an effort: the role of striatum in signaling physical effort of a chosen action.

The possibility that we will have to invest effort influences our future choice behavior. Indeed deciding whether an action is actually worth taking is a key element in the expression of human apathy or inertia. There is a well developed literature on brain activity related to the anticipation of effort, but how effort affects actual choice is less well understood. Furthermore, prior work is largely restricted to mental as opposed to physical effort or has confounded temporal with effortful costs. Here we investigated choice behavior and brain activity, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, in a study where healthy participants are required to make decisions between effortful gripping, where the factors of force (high and low) and reward (high and low) were varied, and a choice of merely holding a grip device for minimal monetary reward. Behaviorally, we show that force level influences the likelihood of choosing an effortful grip. We observed greater activity in the putamen when participants opt to grip an option with low effort compared with when they opt to grip an option with high effort. The results suggest that, over and above a nonspecific role in movement anticipation and salience, the putamen plays a crucial role in computations for choice that involves effort costs.

Pain relativity in motor control.

Motivational theories of pain highlight its role in people's choices of actions that avoid bodily damage. By contrast, little is known regarding how pain influences action implementation. To explore this less-understood area, we conducted a study in which participants had to rapidly point to a target area to win money while avoiding an overlapping penalty area that would cause pain in their contralateral hand. We found that pain intensity and target-penalty proximity repelled participants' movement away from pain and that motor execution was influenced not by absolute pain magnitudes but by relative pain differences. Our results indicate that the magnitude and probability of pain have a precise role in guiding motor control and that representations of pain that guide action are, at least in part, relative rather than absolute. Additionally, our study shows that the implicit monetary valuation of pain, like many explicit valuations (e.g., patients' use of rating scales in medical contexts), is unstable, a finding that has implications for pain treatment in clinical contexts.

Altruistic learning.

The origin of altruism remains one of the most enduring puzzles of human behaviour. Indeed, true altruism is often thought either not to exist, or to arise merely as a miscalculation of otherwise selfish behaviour. In this paper, we argue that altruism emerges directly from the way in which distinct human decision-making systems learn about rewards. Using insights provided by neurobiological accounts of human decision-making, we suggest that reinforcement learning in game-theoretic social interactions (habitisation over either individuals or games) and observational learning (either imitative of inference based) lead to altruistic behaviour. This arises not only as a result of computational efficiency in the face of processing complexity, but as a direct consequence of optimal inference in the face of uncertainty. Critically, we argue that the fact that evolutionary pressure acts not over the object of learning ('what' is learned), but over the learning systems themselves ('how' things are learned), enables the evolution of altruism despite the direct threat posed by free-riders.

Encoding of marginal utility across time in the human brain.

Marginal utility theory prescribes the relationship between the objective property of the magnitude of rewards and their subjective value. Despite its pervasive influence, however, there is remarkably little direct empirical evidence for such a theory of value, let alone of its neurobiological basis. We show that human preferences in an intertemporal choice task are best described by a model that integrates marginally diminishing utility with temporal discounting. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we show that activity in the dorsal striatum encodes both the marginal utility of rewards, over and above that which can be described by their magnitude alone, and the discounting associated with increasing time. In addition, our data show that dorsal striatum may be involved in integrating subjective valuation systems inherent to time and magnitude, thereby providing an overall metric of value used to guide choice behavior. Furthermore, during choice, we show that anterior cingulate activity correlates with the degree of difficulty associated with dissonance between value and time. Our data support an integrative architecture for decision making, revealing the neural representation of distinct subcomponents of value that may contribute to impulsivity and decisiveness.

The role of human orbitofrontal cortex in value comparison for incommensurable objects.

The human orbitofrontal cortex is strongly implicated in appetitive valuation. Whether its role extends to support comparative valuation necessary to explain probabilistic choice patterns for incommensurable goods is unknown. Using a binary choice paradigm, we derived the subjective values of different bundles of goods, under conditions of both gain and loss. We demonstrate that orbitofrontal activation reflects the difference in subjective value between available options, an effect evident across valuation for both gains and losses. In contrast, activation in dorsal striatum and supplementary motor areas reflects subjects' choice probabilities. These findings indicate that orbitofrontal cortex plays a pivotal role in valuation for incommensurable goods, a critical component process in human decision making.

A genetically mediated bias in decision making driven by failure of amygdala control.

Genetic variation at the serotonin transporter-linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR) is associated with altered amygdala reactivity and lack of prefrontal regulatory control. Similar regions mediate decision-making biases driven by contextual cues and ambiguity, for example the "framing effect." We hypothesized that individuals hemozygous for the short (s) allele at the 5-HTTLPR would be more susceptible to framing. Participants, selected as homozygous for either the long (la) or s allele, performed a decision-making task where they made choices between receiving an amount of money for certain and taking a gamble. A strong bias was evident toward choosing the certain option when the option was phrased in terms of gains and toward gambling when the decision was phrased in terms of losses (the frame effect). Critically, this bias was significantly greater in the ss group compared with the lala group. In simultaneously acquired functional magnetic resonance imaging data, the ss group showed greater amygdala during choices made in accord, compared with those made counter to the frame, an effect not seen in the lala group. These differences were also mirrored by differences in anterior cingulate-amygdala coupling between the genotype groups during decision making. Specifically, lala participants showed increased coupling during choices made counter to, relative to those made in accord with, the frame, with no such effect evident in ss participants. These data suggest that genetically mediated differences in prefrontal-amygdala interactions underpin interindividual differences in economic decision making.

The price of pain and the value of suffering.

Estimating the financial value of pain informs issues as diverse as the market price of analgesics, the cost-effectiveness of clinical treatments, compensation for injury, and the response to public hazards. Such valuations are assumed to reflect a stable trade-off between relief of discomfort and money. Here, using an auction-based health-market experiment, we show that the price people pay for relief of pain is strongly determined by the local context of the market, that is, by recent intensities of pain or immediately disposable income (but not overall wealth). The absence of a stable valuation metric suggests that the dynamic behavior of health markets is not predictable from the static behavior of individuals. We conclude that the results follow the dynamics of habit-formation models of economic theory, and thus, this study provides the first scientific basis for this type of preference modeling.

Neural activity associated with the passive prediction of ambiguity and risk for aversive events.

In economic decision making, outcomes are described in terms of risk (uncertain outcomes with certain probabilities) and ambiguity (uncertain outcomes with uncertain probabilities). Humans are more averse to ambiguity than to risk, with a distinct neural system suggested as mediating this effect. However, there has been no clear disambiguation of activity related to decisions themselves from perceptual processing of ambiguity. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, we contrasted ambiguity, defined as a lack of information about outcome probabilities, to risk, where outcome probabilities are known, or ignorance, where outcomes are completely unknown and unknowable. We modified previously learned pavlovian CS+ stimuli such that they became an ambiguous cue and contrasted evoked brain activity both with an unmodified predictive CS+ (risky cue), and a cue that conveyed no information about outcome probabilities (ignorance cue). Compared with risk, ambiguous cues elicited activity in posterior inferior frontal gyrus and posterior parietal cortex during outcome anticipation. Furthermore, a similar set of regions was activated when ambiguous cues were compared with ignorance cues. Thus, regions previously shown to be engaged by decisions about ambiguous rewarding outcomes are also engaged by ambiguous outcome prediction in the context of aversive outcomes. Moreover, activation in these regions was seen even when no actual decision is made. Our findings suggest that these regions subserve a general function of contextual analysis when search for hidden information during outcome anticipation is both necessary and meaningful.

Blocking central opiate function modulates hedonic impact and anterior cingulate response to rewards and losses.

Reward processing is linked to specific neuromodulatory systems with a dopaminergic contribution to reward learning and motivational drive being well established. Neuromodulatory influences on hedonic responses to actual receipt of reward, or punishment, referred to as experienced utility are less well characterized, although a link to the endogenous opioid system is suggested. Here, in a combined functional magnetic resonance imaging-psychopharmacological investigation, we used naloxone to block central opioid function while subjects performed a gambling task associated with rewards and losses of different magnitudes, in which the mean expected value was always zero. A graded influence of naloxone on reward outcome was evident in an attenuation of pleasure ratings for larger reward outcomes, an effect mirrored in attenuation of brain activity to increasing reward magnitude in rostral anterior cingulate cortex. A more striking effect was seen for losses such that under naloxone all levels of negative outcome were rated as more unpleasant. This hedonic effect was associated with enhanced activity in anterior insula and caudal anterior cingulate cortex, areas implicated in aversive processing. Our data indicate that a central opioid system contributes to both reward and loss processing in humans and directly modulates the hedonic experience of outcomes.

Anchors, scales and the relative coding of value in the brain.

People are alarmingly susceptible to manipulations that change both their expectations and experience of the value of goods. Recent studies in behavioral economics suggest such variability reflects more than mere caprice. People commonly judge options and prices in relative terms, rather than absolutely, and display strong sensitivity to exemplar and price anchors. We propose that these findings elucidate important principles about reward processing in the brain. In particular, relative valuation may be a natural consequence of adaptive coding of neuronal firing to optimise sensitivity across large ranges of value. Furthermore, the initial apparent arbitrariness of value may reflect the brains' attempts to optimally integrate diverse sources of value-relevant information in the face of perceived uncertainty. Recent findings in neuroscience support both accounts, and implicate regions in the orbitofrontal cortex, striatum, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in the construction of value.

Striatal activity underlies novelty-based choice in humans.

The desire to seek new and unfamiliar experiences is a fundamental behavioral tendency in humans and other species. In economic decision making, novelty seeking is often rational, insofar as uncertain options may prove valuable and advantageous in the long run. Here, we show that, even when the degree of perceptual familiarity of an option is unrelated to choice outcome, novelty nevertheless drives choice behavior. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we show that this behavior is specifically associated with striatal activity, in a manner consistent with computational accounts of decision making under uncertainty. Furthermore, this activity predicts interindividual differences in susceptibility to novelty. These data indicate that the brain uses perceptual novelty to approximate choice uncertainty in decision making, which in certain contexts gives rise to a newly identified and quantifiable source of human irrationality.

Confidence in beliefs about pain predicts expectancy effects on pain perception and anticipatory processing in right anterior insula.

Psychological factors play a major role in exacerbating chronic pain. Effective self-management of pain is often hindered by inaccurate beliefs about the nature of pain which lead to a high degree of emotional reactivity. Probabilistic models of perception state that greater confidence (certainty) in beliefs increases their influence on perception and behavior. In this study, we treat confidence as a metacognitive process dissociable from the content of belief. We hypothesized that confidence is associated with anticipatory activation of areas of the pain matrix involved with top-down modulation of pain. Healthy volunteers rated their beliefs about the emotional distress that experimental pain would cause, and separately rated their level of confidence in this belief. Confidence predicted the influence of anticipation cues on experienced pain. We measured brain activity during anticipation of pain using high-density EEG and used electromagnetic tomography to determine neural substrates of this effect. Confidence correlated with activity in right anterior insula, posterior midcingulate and inferior parietal cortices during the anticipation of pain. Activity in the right anterior insula predicted a greater influence of anticipation cues on pain perception, whereas activity in right inferior parietal cortex predicted a decreased influence of anticipatory cues. The results support probabilistic models of pain perception and suggest that confidence in beliefs is an important determinant of expectancy effects on pain perception.