I did that! Measuring users' experience of agency in their own actions

Cognitive neuroscience defines the sense of agency as the experience of controlling one's own actions and, through this control, affecting the external world. We believe that the sense of personal agency is a key factor in how people experience interactions with technology. This paper draws on theoretical perspectives in cognitive neuroscience and describes two implicit methods through which personal agency can be empirically investigated. We report two experiments applying these methods to HCI problems. One shows that a new input modality - skin-based interaction - can substantially increase users' sense of agency. The second demonstrates that variations in the parameters of assistance techniques such as predictive mouse acceleration can have a significant impact on users' sense of agency. The methods presented provide designers with new ways of evaluating and refining empowering interaction techniques and interfaces, in which users experience an instinctive sense of control and ownership over their actions. Copyright 2012 ACM.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging of impaired sensory prediction in schizophrenia.

IMPORTANCE: Forward models predict the sensory consequences of planned actions and permit discrimination of self- and non-self-elicited sensation; their impairment in schizophrenia is implied by an abnormality in behavioral force-matching and the flawed agency judgments characteristic of positive symptoms, including auditory hallucinations and delusions of control. OBJECTIVE: To assess attenuation of sensory processing by self-action in individuals with schizophrenia and its relation to current symptom severity. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: Functional magnetic resonance imaging data were acquired while medicated individuals with schizophrenia (n = 19) and matched controls (n = 19) performed a factorially designed sensorimotor task in which the occurrence and relative timing of action and sensation were manipulated. The study took place at the neuroimaging research unit at the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, and the Maudsley Hospital. RESULTS: In controls, a region of secondary somatosensory cortex exhibited attenuated activation when sensation and action were synchronous compared with when the former occurred after an unexpected delay or alone. By contrast, reduced attenuation was observed in the schizophrenia group, suggesting that these individuals were unable to predict the sensory consequences of their own actions. Furthermore, failure to attenuate secondary somatosensory cortex processing was predicted by current hallucinatory severity. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: Although comparably reduced attenuation has been reported in the verbal domain, this work implies that a more general physiologic deficit underlies positive symptoms of schizophrenia.

Can, and should, behavioural neuroscience influence public policy?

Recent years have seen enormous demand amongst policy makers for new insights from the behavioural sciences, especially neuroscience. This demand is matched by an increasing willingness on behalf of behavioural scientists to translate the policy implications of their work. But can neuroscience really help shape the governance of a nation? Or does this represent growing misuse of neuroscience to attach scientific authority to policy, plus a clutch of neuroscientists trying to overstate their findings for a taste of power?. © 2012.