Royalty Licensing

Published as an article in: Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 2, pages 284-287.

Two-part tariff licensing mechanisms

Most of the patent licensing agreements that are observed include royalties, in particular per-unit or ad valorem royalties. This paper shows that in a differ entiated duopoly that competes á la Cournot the optimal contract for an internal patentee always includes a positive royalty. Moreover, we show that the patentee would prefer to use ad valorem royalties rather than per-unit royalties when goods are complements or when they are substitutes and the degree of differentiation is suffciently low. The reason is that by including an ad valorem royalty in the licensing contract the patentee can commit strategically to be more (less) aggressive when goods are complements (substitutes) since his licensing revenues become increasing with the price of output of his rival. As a result, licensing may hurt consumers although it always increases social welfare.

Quota and Licensing Systems in the VIII Division European Anchovy

Paper presented at 12th Annual Conference of EAERE 2003 Bilbao (Spain)

Basque nominalizations and the role of structural Case in the licensing of null arguments

[EN] This article investigates the question of the licensing of null arguments in the so-called pro-drop languages. By focusing on the licensing of null subjects in the different types of -T(Z)E nominalizations in Basque, it aims at defining in a precise way the crucial feature that makes pro-drop possible in a clause. The central claim is that what licenses subject-drop is the assignment of structural Case. That is, it is argued that a subject can be null if and only if it is assigned structural Case. Different aspects of T(Z)E nominalizations are also explored, which show that even if these clauses are similar in the surface, they can be syntactically very different and furthermore, that infinitive clauses marked with the same nominalizing morpheme can also have diverging structures.

Tracking the evolution of waste recycling research using overlay maps of science

Tracking the evolution of research in waste recycling science (WRS) can be valuable for environmental agencies, as well as for recycling businesses. Maps of science are visual, easily readable representations of the cognitive structure of a branch of science, a particular area of research or the global spectrum of scientific production. They are generally built upon evidence collected from reliable sources of information, such as patent and scientific publication databases. This study uses the methodology developed by Rafols et al. (2010) to make a “double overlay map” of WRS upon a basemap reflecting the cognitive structure of all journal-published science, for the years 2005 and 2010. The analysis has taken into account the cognitive areas where WRS articles are published and the areas from where it takes its intellectual nourishing, paying special attention to the growing trends of the key areas. Interpretation of results lead to the conclusion that extraction of energy from waste will probably be an important research topic in the future, along with developments in general chemistry and chemical engineering oriented to the recovery of valuable materials from waste. Agricultural and material sciences, together with the combined economics, politics and geography field, are areas with which WRS shows a relevant and ever increasing cognitive relationship.

Moral cleansing and moral licenses: experimental evidence

Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).