El arte de registrar. La importancia de los registros de enfermería

[ES]La literatura especializada coincide en señalar serios problemas en los registros de enfermería. Se registra mal por muchos motivos: por desconocimiento, por inexperiencia, por la idea de que es una tarea burocrática y ajena, y sobre todo por una idea distorsionada del rol de la enfermería. Un registro adecuado contribuye no sólo a la calidad de los cuidados, sino que hace visible el trabajo que enfermería realiza y puede contribuir a desarrollar la disciplina enfermera y reforzar su rol independiente. En este trabajo se analiza, a partir de la literatura especializada, el problema de los registros de enfermería: los problemas más frecuentes y sus causas, la perspectiva de las enfermeras sobre los registros, los problemas éticos y legales que implican y las posibles soluciones para una nueva manera de registrar.

Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction

In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might simply unexpectedly forget what they previously observed (but not chose). Following this idea, this paper drops the assumption that the information structure of extensive-form games is commonly known; that is, it introduces uncertainty into players' capacity to observe each others' past choices. Using this approach, our main result provides the following epistemic characterisation: if players (i) are rational,(ii) have strong belief in both opponents' rationality and opponents' capacity to observe others' choices, and (iii) have common belief in both opponents' future rationality and op-ponents' future capacity to observe others' choices, then the backward induction outcome obtains. Consequently, we do not require perfect information, and players observing each others' choices is often irrelevant from a strategic point of view. The analysis extends {from generic games with perfect information to games with not necessarily perfect information{the work by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Perea (2014), who provide different sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome.

Political Institutions, Technology and Growth: a dynamic panel approach

This paper investigates whether the effect of political institutions on sectoral economic performance is determined by the level of technological development of industries. Building on previous studies on the linkages among political institutions, technology and economic growth, we employ the dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for a sample of 4,134 country-industries from 61 industries and 89 countries over the 1990-2010 period. Our main findings suggest that changes of political institutions towards higher levels of democracy, political rights and civil liberties enhance economic growth in technologically developed industries. On the contrary, the same institutional changes might retard economic growth of those industries that are below a technological development threshold. Overall, these results give evidence of a technologically conditioned nature of political institutions to be growth-promoting.