La metodología científica en economía de la empresa en la actualidad

[ES] Mientras la realidad se transforma a gran ritmo, las ideas de ciencia y de conocimiento científico entran en crisis. Esta crisis también se manifiesta en los estudios empresariales: muchos afirman que la Economía de la Empresa no es ciencia, sino un conjunto de conocimientos diversos, débilmente conectados entre sí. Otros se pierden en investigaciones alejadas de la realidad, y un último grupo no consigue remontar un enfoque meramente practicista. Por ello, estimamos que es un buen momento para recordar los fundamentos que sustentan una ciencia: su objeto formal y material y su método. Para ello se realizará una exposición sintética del pensamiento del profesor Soldevilla.

The body social: an enactive approach to the self

This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas' notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator

We can work it out: an enactive look at cooperation

The past years have seen an increasing debate on cooperation and its unique human character. Philosophers and psychologists have proposed that cooperative activities are characterized by shared goals to which participants are committed through the ability to understand each other’s intentions. Despite its popularity, some serious issues arise with this approach to cooperation. First, one may challenge the assumption that high-level mental processes are necessary for engaging in acting cooperatively. If they are, then how do agents that do not possess such ability (preverbal children, or children with autism who are often claimed to be mind-blind) engage in cooperative exchanges, as the evidence suggests? Secondly, to define cooperation as the result of two de-contextualized minds reading each other’s intentions may fail to fully acknowledge the complexity of situated, interactional dynamics and the interplay of variables such as the participants’ relational and personal history and experience. In this paper we challenge such accounts of cooperation, calling for an embodied approach that sees cooperation not only as an individual attitude toward the other, but also as a property of interaction processes. Taking an enactive perspective, we argue that cooperation is an intrinsic part of any interaction, and that there can be cooperative interaction before complex communicative abilities are achieved. The issue then is not whether one is able or not to read the other’s intentions, but what it takes to participate in joint action. From this basic account, it should be possible to build up more complex forms of cooperation as needed. Addressing the study of cooperation in these terms may enhance our understanding of human social development, and foster our knowledge of different ways of engaging with others, as in the case of autism.

A genealogical map of the concept of habit

The notion of information processing has dominated the study of the mind for over six decades. However, before the advent of cognitivism, one of the most prominent theoretical ideas was that of Habit. This is a concept with a rich and complex history, which is again starting to awaken interest, following recent embodied, enactive critiques of computationalist frameworks. We offer here a very brief history of the concept of habit in the form of a genealogical network-map. This serves to provide an overview of the richness of this notion and as a guide for further re-appraisal. We identify 77 thinkers and their influences, and group them into seven schools of thought. Two major trends can be distinguished. One is the associationist trend, starting with the work of Locke and Hume, developed by Hartley, Bain, and Mill to be later absorbed into behaviorism through pioneering animal psychologists (Morgan and Thorndike). This tradition conceived of habits atomistically and as automatisms (a conception later debunked by cognitivism). Another historical trend we have called organicism inherits the legacy of Aristotle and develops along German idealism, French spiritualism, pragmatism, and phenomenology. It feeds into the work of continental psychologists in the early 20th century, influencing important figures such as Merleau-Ponty, Piaget, and Gibson. But it has not yet been taken up by mainstream cognitive neuroscience and psychology. Habits, in this tradition, are seen as ecological, self-organizing structures that relate to a web of predispositions and plastic dependencies both in the agent and in the environment. In addition, they are not conceptualized in opposition to rational, volitional processes, but as transversing a continuum from reflective to embodied intentionality. These are properties that make habit a particularly attractive idea for embodied, enactive perspectives, which can now re-evaluate it in light of dynamical systems theory and complexity research.

An enactive and dynamical systems theory account of dyadic relationships

Many social relationships are a locus of struggle and suffering, either at the individual or interactional level. In this paper we explore why this is the case and suggest a modeling approach for dyadic interactions and the well-being of the participants. To this end we bring together an enactive approach to self with dynamical systems theory. Our basic assumption is that the quality of any social interaction or relationship fundamentally depends on the nature and constitution of the individuals engaged in these interactions. From an enactive perspective the self is conceived as an embodied and socially enacted autonomous system striving to maintain an identity. This striving involves a basic two-fold goal: the ability to exist as an individual in one's own right, while also being open to and affected by others. In terms of dynamical systems theory one can thus consider the individual self as a self-other organized system represented by a phase space spanned by the dimensions of distinction and participation, where attractors can be defined. Based on two everyday examples of dyadic relationship we propose a simple model of relationship dynamics, in which struggle or well-being in the dyad is analyzed in terms of movements of dyadic states that are in tension or in harmony with individually developed attractors. Our model predicts that relationships can be sustained when the dyad develops a new joint attractor toward which dyadic states tend to move, and well-being when this attractor is in balance with the individuals' attractors. We outline how this can inspire research on psychotherapy. The psychotherapy process itself provides a setting that supports clients to become aware how they fare with regards to the two-fold norm of distinction and participation and develop, through active engagement between client (or couple) and therapist, strategies to co-negotiate their self-organization.

Innovación, capacidad productiva, formación en el puesto de trabajo y productividad

[ES] Este estudio analiza la relación entre productividad laboral, innovación radical, innovación incremental, tecnología incorporada en maquinaria y equipos, utilización de la capacidad productiva y formación. Los datos utilizados son de empresas españolas, manufactureras y de servicios, procedentes de la Business Environment and enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). La técnica empleada para estimar los coeficientes del modelo es la regresión mínimo cuadrática ordinaria, ya que la variable dependiente (productividad laboral) es continua. Los resultados indican que la innovación radical y la formación influyen positiva y significativamente sobre la productividad laboral. La influencia de la tecnología incorporada también es significativa, pero de signo negativo. Finalmente, señalar que las empresas que más exportan y las de mayor tamaño alcanzan mayores niveles de productividad. Los hallazgos encontrados en este estudio tienen implicaciones para los responsables de la política económica. Los decisores políticos españoles deben promover y subsidiar la adquisición de maquinaria y equipos más eficientes para las empresas que alcanzan menores niveles de productividad, así como subsidiar la formación de trabajadores cualificados en el manejo de estos nuevos equipos. Además, también deben promover y subsidiar el desarrollo de actividades de elevado contenido en I+D para las empresas que consiguen elevados niveles de productividad, a fin de que incrementen su desempeño en innovación radical. La promoción y subsidiación de programas de formación relacionados con la I+D también resulta esencial en este tipo de empresas, máxime en un escenario caracterizado por un cambio tecnológico intenso y que se produce con gran rapidez.