14 resultados para censorship under Franco
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[ES] La historia del teatro traducido en la España del siglo XX está aún por escribirse. Este segmento de nuestra cultura traducida ha sido tradicionalmente ignorado en las historias del teatro español. Por suerte, lo que hace sólo veinte años se describía como un páramo investigador es hoy un terreno mucho mejor abonado y roturado. Las investigaciones sobre teatro traducido que han visto la luz progresivamente en estos años nos permitirán en breve escribir y documentar la historia del teatro traducido. Se ofrece en este artículo una visión del modo en que podría acometerse esa tarea,partiendo de lo ya investigado en el proyecto TRACE desde la perspectiva de lo archivado por la censura (de teatro) en la época de Franco.
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9 p.
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Editores:Micaela Muñoz-Calvo; Carmen Buesa-Gómez
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This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms can choose between a flexible production technology which allows them to produce two different products and a dedicated production technology which limits production to only one product. We analyze whether the incentives to adopt the flexible technology are smaller or greater in a managerial delegation model than under strict profit maximization. We obtain that the asymmetric equilibrium in which only one firm adopts the flexible technology can be sustained under strategic delegation but not under strict profit maximization when products are substitutes. We extend the analysis to consider welfare implications.
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In this paper, we show that in order for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output, the demands of the strong markets should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave than the demands of the weak markets. By making the distinction between adjusted concavity of the inverse demand and adjusted concavity of the direct demand, we are able to state necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output.
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In this paper it is shown that the setting up of a social housing system may decrease the total number of houses built in the market, induce a price of non-social houses greater than the price of houses without that system and increase the profits of housing developers even in situations where they have to sell social houses at a price below production cost. The analysis considers a situation with imperfect competition in the housing market and with a social housing system where housing developers must provide some social houses when they obtain a permit to build non-social houses.
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Published as an article in: Journal of International Money and Finance, 2010, vol. 29, issue 6, pages 1171-1191.
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This paper studies the behavior of the implied volatility function (smile) when the true distribution of the underlying asset is consistent with the stochastic volatility model proposed by Heston (1993). The main result of the paper is to extend previous results applicable to the smile as a whole to alternative degrees of moneyness. The conditions under which the implied volatility function changes whenever there is a change in the parameters associated with Hestons stochastic volatility model for a given degree of moneyness are given.
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Fecha: 26/28-5-1939 (>1970 copia) / Unidad de instalación: Carpeta 45 - Expediente 2-5 / Nº de pág.: 7 (mecanografiadas)
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Fecha: 26/27-5-1939 / Unidad de instalación: Carpeta 45 - Expediente 2-8 / Nº de pág.: 4 (mecanografiadas)
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Fecha: s.f. (>1970 copia) / Unidad de instalación: Carpeta 45 - Expediente 2-28 / Nº de pág.: 15 (mecanografiadas)