Strategic Interaction and Conventions

The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometimes, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, even when coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.

Choice of Flexible Production Technologies Under Strategic Delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms can choose between a flexible production technology which allows them to produce two different products and a dedicated production technology which limits production to only one product. We analyze whether the incentives to adopt the flexible technology are smaller or greater in a managerial delegation model than under strict profit maximization. We obtain that the asymmetric equilibrium in which only one firm adopts the flexible technology can be sustained under strategic delegation but not under strict profit maximization when products are substitutes. We extend the analysis to consider welfare implications.

Cost-Saving production technologies and strategic delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms that produce a differentiated good can choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the latter. By giving managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we find that Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology than the strict profit maximization case. However, the results may be reversed under Cournot competition. We show that if the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently low (high), the incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology is larger under strict profit maximization (strategic delegation).

On the strategic equivalence of multiple-choice test scoring rules

A disadvantage of multiple-choice tests is that students have incentives to guess. To discourage guessing, it is common to use scoring rules that either penalize wrong answers or reward omissions. These scoring rules are considered equivalent in psychometrics, although experimental evidence has not always been consistent with this claim. We model students' decisions and show, first, that equivalence holds only under risk neutrality and, second, that the two rules can be modified so that they become equivalent even under risk aversion. This paper presents the results of a field experiment in which we analyze the decisions of subjects taking multiple-choice exams. The evidence suggests that differences between scoring rules are due to risk aversion as theory predicts. We also find that the number of omitted items depends on the scoring rule, knowledge, gender and other covariates.

Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market

The paper has two major contributions to the theory of repeated games. First, we build a supergame oligopoly model where firms compete in supply functions, we show how collusion sustainability is affected by the presence of a convex cost function, the magnitude of both the slope of demand market, and the number of rivals. Then, we compare the results with those of the traditional Cournot reversion under the same structural characteristics. We find how depending on the number of firms and the slope of the linear demand, collusion sustainability is easier under supply function than under Cournot competition. The conclusions of the models are simulated with data from the Spanish wholesale electricity market to predict lower bounds of the discount factors.

Determinantes sociales y cognitivos en el espíritu emprendedor: un estudio exploratorio entre estudiantes argentinos

[ES] En este artículo analizamos las intenciones de emprender un negocio por parte de un grupo de estudiantes argentinos que cursaban la especialización en Dirección Estratégica de Recursos Humanos en la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Los resultados del estudio muestran que estos estudiantes desean crear su propio negocio, pero las posibilidades de creación del mismo dependen de varios factores. Entre todos ellos destaca la autoeficacia; aquellos estudiantes que muestran puntuaciones más elevadas en esta variable son los que manifiestan más intención por crear un negocio. Esta intención, en contra de lo esperado, es menor para los alumnos que señalan poseer más apoyo social. No encontramos que las cargas familiares o la experiencia previa en creación de empresas tengan un efecto significativo.

Morals in business organizations: an approach based on strategic value and strength for business management

[EN] In the last decades, the topic of business ethics has attracted great interest at the academic and professional levels. Nowadays business ethics is being increasingly implemented as a necessary discipline in universities’ study plans on business management. Moreover, its importance is also evident according to the worldwide increase of organizations and/or institutions that have implemented ethics systems. However, some approaches thoroughly do not consider the importance and the need of an ethical behaviour and are still guiding the actions and the way of thinking of many academics and professionals led to consider that the only responsibility of business is limited just to profit maximization.

Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals

The Random Utility Model (RUM) of voting behavior can account for strategic voting by making use of proxy indicators that measure voter incentives to vote strategically. The contribution of this paper is to propose a new method to estimate the RUM in the presence of strategic voters, without having to construct proxy measures of strategic voting incentives. Our method can be used to infer the counterfactual sincere vote of those who vote strategically and provides an estimate of the size of strategic voting. We illustrate the procedure using post-electoral survey data from Spain. Our calculations indicate that strategic voting in Spain is about 2.19 per cent

International Support of Climate Change Policies in Developing Countries: Strategic, Moral and Fairness Aspects

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A Unifying model of strategic network formation

Documento de trabajo

Entrepreneurship in the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)

Currently entrepreneurship is a basic pillar in the socioeconomic area of any country since it contributes to attain the government objectives of job creation and boost of dynamism and competitiveness of the business network. These aspects are even more crucial nowadays due to the global economic crisis. This paper attempts to provide some new insights about the scientific field entrepreneurship in the Basque Country analyzing some aspects related to the entrepreneurial activity, the profile of the entrepreneur and the characteristics of the entrepreneurial businesses. It also aims to provide empirical evidence that proves the good features of the spin-offs and TBF groups as job creators, technology transferors to the society and important actors in the growth and development of the economies for both the business network and its surrounding society. To this aim, a descriptive study has been performed of the firms belonging to the Zitek Program of Bizkaia Campus of the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU).

Is it possible to measure social entrepreneurship in firms?

[EN] This study defines and proposes a measurement scale for social entrepreneurship (SE) in its broadest sense. The broad definition of SE covers for-profit firms that use social aims as a core component of their strategy. By pursuing social aims, these firms can boost the value of their products or services for consumers or exploit new business areas. Under this broad definition of SE, profit-seeking and the pursuit of social aims converge, thereby revealing a form of SE that has received little attention in either theoretical or empirical research. To fill this research gap, the present study proposes a measurement scale to measure broad SE in firms. The process used to build the scale draws upon research by Churchill (1979) and DeVellis (1991) and combines the Delphi technique, a pre-test questionnaire and structural equation modelling. The main aim of this research is to develop a scale capable of measuring broad SE in firms. The theoretical basis for the scale is supported by an empirical study in the hotel sector. The scale provides a valid, reliable instrument for measuring broad SE in firms. The scale meets all sociometric properties required of measurement scales in the social sciences, namely dimensionality, reliability and validity.