Institutional designs to face the dark side of total allowable catches

Setting total allowable catches (TACs) is an endogenous process in which different agents and institutions, often with conflicting interests and opportunistic behaviour, try to influence policy-makers. Such policy-makers, far from being the benevolent social planners many would wish them to be, may also pursue self-interest when making final decisions. Although restricted knowledge of stock abundance and population dynamics, and weakness in enforcement, have effects, these other factors may explain the reason why TAC management has failed to guarantee sustainable exploitation of fish resources. Rejecting the exogeneity of the TAC and taking advantage of fruitful debate on economic policy (i.e. the rules vs. discretion debate, and that surrounding the independence of central banks), two institutional developments are analysed as potential mechanisms to face up to misconceptions about TACs: long-term harvest control rules, and a central bank of fish.

Emergent synchronisation properties of a refrigerator demand side management system

In order to analyse the possibilities of improving grid stability on island systems by local demand response mechanisms,a multi-agent simulation model is presented. To support the primary reserve, an under-frequency load shedding (UFLS)using refrigerator loads is modelled. The model represents the system at multiple scales, by recreating each refrigerator individually, and coupling the whole population of refrigerators to a model which simulates the frequency response of the energy system, allowing for cross-scale interactions. Using a simple UFLS strategy, emergent phenomena appear in the simulation. Synchronisation e ects among the individual loads were discovered, which can have strong, undesirable impacts on the system such as oscillations of loads and frequency. The phase transition from a stable to an oscillating system is discussed.