Resale in Auctions with Financial Constraints

This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face nancial constraints that may force them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at a resale market. First we show that the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria of second- price auctions (Garratt and Tröger, 2006) generalizes to situations with partial resale where only the high value bidder is nancially constrained. However, when all players face nancial constraints the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria disappear. Therefore, for auctioning big facilities or contracts where all bidders are nancially constrained and there is a resale market, the second price auction remains a simple and appropriate mechanism to achieve an e¢ cient allocation.

Dutch Auctions: The case of fish auction in Bermeo

In this work I will analyze fish auctions focusing on a particular case: fish auctions in Bermeo. The purpose is to explain if at present the Dutch auction is the appropriate mechanism in the field of fish auctions or there are better alternatives for the sale of fish. For the fulfillment of this essay, I will first introduce some general notions on auctions and more particularly on Dutch auctions describing their properties and limitations.