Incorporating American Dreams into Australian Stories: Political Erasure and cultural transference in film adaptations of Australian Literary Classics

Eterio Pajares, Raquel Merino y José Miguel Santamaría (eds.)

Economic Efficiency, Environmental Effectiveness and Political Feasibility of Energy Efficiency Rebates: The Case of the Spanish Energy Efficiency 'Renove' Plan

29 p.

Mechanisms of E2F2-mediated transcriptional repression

In this work we wanted to study the mechanism of E2F2-mediated repression. Our hypothesis is that E2F2 activates the expression of one or more E2F members of the “repressor” subset of the family through the E2F motifs present in their promoters, and those repressor E2F(s) would subsequently repress the target promoters. To address this hypothesis, we focused on E2F7. E2F7 is a repressor that lacks the Rb binding domain, and associates with DNA through E2F binding sites (de Bruin et al., 2003). Furthermore, E2F7 itself is also regulated by E2F motifs on its own promoter, and it has been shown to repress DNA metabolism and replication genes in late S-phase (de Bruin et al., 2003; Westendorp et al., 2012). E2F7, together with E2F8 has been found to form heterodimers, being critical on cell proliferation and development, and both seem to have similar functions (Li et al., 2008). Preliminary results from Zubiaga’s group have indicated that E2F2 activates E2F7 transcription in U2OS cells, suggesting that E2F2’s repressor function could be mediated by E2F7. For this purpose, we focused on studying E2F7’s role on the target genes previously known to be repressed by E2F2: Chk1 and Mcm5. The specific aims for this work were the following: - Confirm that E2F2 induces E2F7 in HEK-293T cells - Assess whether E2F7 acts as a transcriptional repressor on E2F sites - Evaluate the role of E2F7 on E2F2-mediated transcriptional repression of Chk1 and Mcm5.

From social to political. New forms of mobilization and democratization. Conference proceedings

In the recent evolution of contemporary social movements three phases can be identified. The first phase is marked by the labour movement and the systemic importance attributed to the labour conflict in industrial societies. This conflict has been interpreted as a consequence of the shortcoming of social integration mechanisms by Emile Durkheim, as a rational conflict by entrepreneurs’ and workers’ interests by Max Wener, and as a central class struggle for the transformation of society by Karl Marx. The second phase in this development was led by the new social movements of the post-industrial society of the 1960s and 1970s’ students, women and environmentalist movements. Two new analytical perspectives have explained these movements’ meaning and actions. Resource mobilization theory (McAdam and Tilly) has focuses on rational attitudes and conflicts. Actionalist sociology, in turn, has identified the new protagonists of social conflicts that replaced the labour movement in postindustrial societies. The third phase emerges in a world characterized by the ascendance of markets, the increasingly prominent role of financial capital flows, the closure of communities, and fundamentalism. In this context, human rights and pro-democratization movements constitute alternatives to global domination and the systemic conditioning of individual and groups.

Political Institutions, Technology and Growth: a dynamic panel approach

This paper investigates whether the effect of political institutions on sectoral economic performance is determined by the level of technological development of industries. Building on previous studies on the linkages among political institutions, technology and economic growth, we employ the dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for a sample of 4,134 country-industries from 61 industries and 89 countries over the 1990-2010 period. Our main findings suggest that changes of political institutions towards higher levels of democracy, political rights and civil liberties enhance economic growth in technologically developed industries. On the contrary, the same institutional changes might retard economic growth of those industries that are below a technological development threshold. Overall, these results give evidence of a technologically conditioned nature of political institutions to be growth-promoting.