Terrorism and the World Economy

Published as an article in: European Economic Review, 2008, vol. 52, issue 1, pages 1-27.

The propagation of nerve pulses: From the Hodgkin-Huxley model to the soliton theory

The present project aims to describe and study the nature and transmission of nerve pulses. First we review a classical model by Hodgkin-Huxley which describes the nerve pulse as a pure electric signal which propagates due to the opening of some time- and voltage-dependent ion channels. Although this model was quite successful when introduced, it fails to provide a satisfactory explanation to other phenomena that occur in the transmission of nerve pulses, therefore a new theory seems to be necessary. The soliton theory is one such theory, which we explain after introducing two topics that are important for its understanding: (i) the lipid melting of membranes, which are found to display nonlinearity and dispersion during the melting transition, and (ii) the discovery and the conditions required for the existence of solitons. In the soliton theory, the pulse is presented as an electromechanical soliton which forces the membrane through the transition while propagating. The action of anesthesia is also explained in the new framework by the melting point depression caused by anesthetics. Finally, we present a comparison between the two models.

The body social: an enactive approach to the self

This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas' notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator