Initiatives for the improvement of continuous management training

[EN] Purpose. This work aims to present, from the company viewpoint, a structured account of management proposals and practices directed toward improving the intensity and effectiveness of continuous management training (CMT). Design/methodology/approach. The article takes as its main theoretical referents the Theory of Human Capital, the Resource-Based Vision and the contributions made via the new institutional economy with regard to the problems of information asymmetry between companies, employees and training providers and completes the proposals that derive from this theoretical approach. To do this, experience-based contributions are collected from a selection of company training and HR managers from twelve Basque companies characterised by their strong investment in management training. The methodology used was qualitative and obtained by different qualitative techniques: Focus Groups, Nominal Groups and the Delphi Method, which make up the so-called Hybrid Delphi. Findings and implications. The proposals are aimed at the main agents in training activity: training providers, associations and public agents engaged in management training and, particularly, companies themselves. The initiatives seek above all to increase training market transparency, to improve mutual commitments between companies and managers, and to link training and development with culture and strategic management, so that firms make optimal investment in management training. Originality/value. The methodology used is original, and the contributions are consistent with the theory, have a proven practical utility, and are presented in a hierarchy, which facilitates decision making.

Demand for Cultural Heritage

Prepared for the Handbook of the Economics of Cultural Heritage. Forthcoming in Edgard Elgar Publisher. Anna Mignosa and Ilde Rizzo (editors)

Experimental Economics Meets Language Choice

Roughly one half of World's languages are in danger of extinction. The endangered languages, spoken by minorities, typically compete with powerful languages such as En- glish or Spanish. Consequently, the speakers of minority languages have to consider that not everybody can speak their language, converting the language choice into strategic,coordination-like situation. We show experimentally that the displacement of minority languages may be partially explained by the imperfect information about the linguistic type of the partner, leading to frequent failure to coordinate on the minority language even between two speakers who can and prefer to use it. The extent of miscoordination correlates with how minoritarian a language is and with the real-life linguistic condition of subjects: the more endangered a language the harder it is to coordinate on its use, and people on whom the language survival relies the most acquire behavioral strategies that lower its use. Our game-theoretical treatment of the issue provides a new perspective for linguistic policies.

Economics of Energy and Climate Change: Origins, Developments and Growth

27 p.