Income Taxation and Growth in an OLG Economy: Does Aggregate Uncertainty Play any Role?

We analyze the effects of capital income taxation on long-run growth in a stochastic, two-period overlapping generations economy. Endogenous growth is driven by a positive externality of physical capital in the production sector that makes firms exhibit an aggregate technology in equilibrium. We distinguish between capital income and labor income, and between attitudes towards risk and intertemporal substitution of consumption. We show necessary and sufficient conditions such that i) increments in the capital income taxation lead to higher equilibrium growth rates, and ii) the effect of changes in the capital income tax rate on the equilibrium growth may be of opposite signs in stochastic and in deterministic economies. Such a sign reversal is shown to be more likely depending on i) how the intertemporal elasticity of substitution compares to one, and ii) the size of second- period labor supply. Numerical simulations show that for reasonable values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, a sign reversal shows up only for implausibly high values of the second- period’s labor supply. The conclusion is that deterministic OLG economies are a good approximation of the effect of taxes on the equilibrium growth rate as in Smith (1996).

Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).

Endogenous Unions Formation

This paper analyzes the process of endogenous union formation in the context of a sequential bargaining model between a firm and several unions and tries to explain why workers may be represented by several unions of different sizes. We show that the equilibrium number of unions and their relative size depend on workers' attitudes toward the risk of unemployment and union configuration is independent of labor productivity.