7 resultados para Evolutionary particle swarm optimizations
Resumo:
Con este proyecto hemos querido proporcionar un conjunto de recursos útiles para la impartición de un curso de Swarm Intelligence enfocado a la Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO). Estos recursos constan de una aplicación en NetLogo para poder experimentar, ejecutar y visualizar los diferentes modelos de la PSO, un review de la Swarm Intelligence profundizando en la PSO y una ontología de PSO que incluye los recursos bibliográficos necesarios para la investigación y la escritura de artículos.
Resumo:
This work is aimed at optimizing the wind turbine rotor speed setpoint algorithm. Several intelligent adjustment strategies have been investigated in order to improve a reward function that takes into account the power captured from the wind and the turbine speed error. After different approaches including Reinforcement Learning, the best results were obtained using a Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)-based wind turbine speed setpoint algorithm. A reward improvement of up to 10.67% has been achieved using PSO compared to a constant approach and 0.48% compared to a conventional approach. We conclude that the pitch angle is the most adequate input variable for the turbine speed setpoint algorithm compared to others such as rotor speed, or rotor angular acceleration.
Resumo:
Binmore and Samuelson (1999) have shown that perturbations (drift) are crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria. We contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift. In particular, this article introduces a microeconomic model of drift based on the similarity theory developed by Tversky (1977), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Rubinstein (1988),(1998). An innovation with respect to those works is that we deal with similarity relations that are derived from the perception that each agent has about how well he is playing the game. In addition, the similarity relations are adapted to a dynamic setting. We obtain different models of drift depending on how we model the agent´s assessment of his behaviour in the game. The examples of the ultimatum game and the chain-store game are used to show the conditions for each model to stabilize elements in the component of Nash equilibria that are not subgame- perfect. It is also shown how some models approximate the laboratory data about those games while others match the data.
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We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.
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208 p.
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201 p.