Mergers in Durable Goods Industries

Revised 2008-11.-- Published as an article in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, 68, pp. 691-701.

Non-Stationary Demand in a Durable Goods Monopoly

In a context where demand for the services of a durable good changes over time, and this change may be uncertain, the paper shows that social welfare may be higher when the monopolist seller can commit to any future price level she wishes than when she cannot. Moreover, the equilibrium under a monopolist with commitment power may Pareto-dominate the equilibrium under a monopolist without commitment ability. These results affect the desired regulation of a durable goods monopolist in this context.

Développement des méthodes de stabilisation pour la conception des circuits hyperfréquences : application à l'optimisation d'un amplificateur de puissance spatial

209 p. : graf.

Optimal overall emissions taxation in durable goods oligopoly

We analyze optimal second-best emission taxes in a durable good industry under imperfect competition. The analysis is performed for three different types of emissions and for situations where the good is rented, sold or simultaneously sold and rented. We show, for durable goods that may cause pollution in a period (or in periods) different from the production period, that the expected overall emission tax and the expected total marginal environmental damage per unit produced in each period are the relevant variables to consider in the analysis of overinternalization and in the comparison of optimal emission taxes for renting, selling and renting-selling firms. Our results allow to extend some previous results in the literature to these durable goods and provide an adequate perspective on some other results (in particular, we point out the limitations of focusing only, for those durable goods, on the level and effects of the optimal emission tax in the production period).