Optimal Correction for Guessing in Multiple-Choice Tests

Building on Item Response Theory we introduce students’ optimal behavior in multiple-choice tests. Our simulations indicate that the optimal penalty is relatively high, because although correction for guessing discriminates against risk-averse subjects, this effect is small compared with the measurement error that the penalty prevents. This result obtains when knowledge is binary or partial, under different normalizations of the score, when risk aversion is related to knowledge and when there is a pass-fail break point. We also find that the mean degree of difficulty should be close to the mean level of knowledge and that the variance of difficulty should be high.

The Impact of Regulation on Pricing Behavior in the Spanish Electricity Market

In this paper we measure the impact of regulatory measures which affected the Spanish electricity wholesale market in the period 2002-2005. Our approach is based on the fact that regulation changes firms' incentives and therefore their market behavior. In the absence of any regulation firms would choose profit- maximizing prices on their residual demands so that the observed gap between optimal and actual prices provides a measure of the effect of regulation. Our results indicate that regulation has decreased wholesale prices considerably, but became less effective at the end of the sample period which explains the change of regulatory regime introduced in 2006.

Choice of Flexible Production Technologies Under Strategic Delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms can choose between a flexible production technology which allows them to produce two different products and a dedicated production technology which limits production to only one product. We analyze whether the incentives to adopt the flexible technology are smaller or greater in a managerial delegation model than under strict profit maximization. We obtain that the asymmetric equilibrium in which only one firm adopts the flexible technology can be sustained under strategic delegation but not under strict profit maximization when products are substitutes. We extend the analysis to consider welfare implications.

On the strategic equivalence of multiple-choice test scoring rules

A disadvantage of multiple-choice tests is that students have incentives to guess. To discourage guessing, it is common to use scoring rules that either penalize wrong answers or reward omissions. These scoring rules are considered equivalent in psychometrics, although experimental evidence has not always been consistent with this claim. We model students' decisions and show, first, that equivalence holds only under risk neutrality and, second, that the two rules can be modified so that they become equivalent even under risk aversion. This paper presents the results of a field experiment in which we analyze the decisions of subjects taking multiple-choice exams. The evidence suggests that differences between scoring rules are due to risk aversion as theory predicts. We also find that the number of omitted items depends on the scoring rule, knowledge, gender and other covariates.

Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market

The paper has two major contributions to the theory of repeated games. First, we build a supergame oligopoly model where firms compete in supply functions, we show how collusion sustainability is affected by the presence of a convex cost function, the magnitude of both the slope of demand market, and the number of rivals. Then, we compare the results with those of the traditional Cournot reversion under the same structural characteristics. We find how depending on the number of firms and the slope of the linear demand, collusion sustainability is easier under supply function than under Cournot competition. The conclusions of the models are simulated with data from the Spanish wholesale electricity market to predict lower bounds of the discount factors.

Endogenous Formation of Competing Partnership with Moral Hazard

Published as an article in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 44, issue 1, pages 183-194.

Determination of drugs used in combined cardiovascular therapy

Cardiovascular diseases are nowadays the first cause of mortality worldwide, causing around the 30% of global deaths each year. The risk of suffering from cardiovascular illnesses is strongly related to some factors such as hypertension, high cholesterol levels, diabetes, obesity The combination of these different risk factors is known as metabolic syndrome and it is considered a pandemic due to the high prevalence worldwide. The pathology of the disorders implies a combined cardiovascular therapy with drugs which have different targets and mechanisms of action, to regulate each factor separately. The simultaneous analysis of these drugs turns interesting but it is a complex task since the determination of multiple substances with different physicochemical properties and physiological behavior is always a challenge for the analytical chemist. The complexity of the biological matrices and the difference in the expected concentrations of some analytes require the development of extremely sensitive and selective determination methods. The aim of this work is to fill the gap existing in this field of the drug analysis, developing analytical methods capable of quantifying the different drugs prescribed in combined cardiovascular therapy simultaneously. Liquid chromatography andem mass spectrometry (LCMS/MS) has been the technique of choice throughout the main part of this work, due to the high sensitivity and selectivity requirements.

Landscape valuation through discrete choice experiments: Current practice and future research reflections

This work has been presented in: V Conference AERNA, Faro (Portugal), 30 May 2012-1 June 2012 and IV Workshop on Valuation Methods in Agro-food and Environmental Economics, Castelldefels (Barcelona, Spain), 12 July 2012-13 July 2012.

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

The Economics of "Why is it so hard to save a threatened Language?"

We study the language choice behavior of bilingual speakers in modern societies, such as the Basque Country, Ireland andWales. These countries have two o cial languages:A, spoken by all, and B, spoken by a minority. We think of the bilinguals in those societies as a population playing repeatedly a Bayesian game in which, they must choose strategically the language, A or B, that might be used in the interaction. The choice has to be made under imperfect information about the linguistic type of the interlocutors. We take the Nash equilibrium of the language use game as a model for real life language choice behavior. It is shown that the predictions made with this model t very well the data about the actual use, contained in the censuses, of Basque, Irish and Welsh languages. Then the question posed by Fishman (2001),which appears in the title, is answered as follows: it is hard, mainly, because bilingual speakers have reached an equilibrium which is evolutionary stable. This means that to solve fast and in a re ex manner their frequent language coordination problem, bilinguals have developed linguistic conventions based chie y on the strategy 'Use the same language as your interlocutor', which weakens the actual use of B.1

Choice under Risk : Theory and Applications

Es útil para estudiantes de postgrado (Master y Doctorado) en cursos de Economía o de Microeconomía en los que se analicen problemas de Decisión en condiciones de Riesgo o Incertidumbre. El documento comienza explicando la Teoría de la Utilidad Esperada. A continuación se estudian la aversión al riesgo, los coeficientes de aversión absoluta y relativa al riesgo, la relación “más averso que” entre agentes económicos y los efectos riqueza sobre las decisiones en algunas relaciones de preferencia utilizadas frecuentemente en el análisis económico. La sección 4 se centra en la comparación entre alternativas arriesgadas en términos de rendimiento y riesgo, considerando la dominancia estocástica de primer y segundo orden y algunas extensiones posteriores de esas relaciones de orden. El documento concluye con doce ejercicios resueltos en los que se aplican los conceptos y resultados expuestos en las secciones anteriores a problemas de decisión en varios contextos

Valuing a Natura 2000 network site to inform land use options using a discrete choice experiment: An illustration from the Basque Country

One of the main problems that public institutions face in the management of protected areas, such as the European Natura 2000 network, is determining how to design and implement sustainable management plans that account for the wide range of marketed and non-marketed benefits they provide to society. This paper presents an application of a stated preference valuation approach aimed at evaluating the social preferences of the population of the Basque Country, Spain, for the key attributes of a regional Natura 2000 network site. According to our results, individuals’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) is higher for attributes associated with non-use values (native tree species and biodiversity conservation) than for attributes associated with use values (agricultural development and commercial forestry). The paper concludes that management policies related to Natura 2000 network sites should account for both for the importance of non-use values and the heterogeneity of the population's preferences in order to minimize potential land use conflicts.

Experimental Economics Meets Language Choice

Roughly one half of World's languages are in danger of extinction. The endangered languages, spoken by minorities, typically compete with powerful languages such as En- glish or Spanish. Consequently, the speakers of minority languages have to consider that not everybody can speak their language, converting the language choice into strategic,coordination-like situation. We show experimentally that the displacement of minority languages may be partially explained by the imperfect information about the linguistic type of the partner, leading to frequent failure to coordinate on the minority language even between two speakers who can and prefer to use it. The extent of miscoordination correlates with how minoritarian a language is and with the real-life linguistic condition of subjects: the more endangered a language the harder it is to coordinate on its use, and people on whom the language survival relies the most acquire behavioral strategies that lower its use. Our game-theoretical treatment of the issue provides a new perspective for linguistic policies.

Is inbreeding avoidance driving female mate choice in Verreaux's sifaka lemurs?

Females of different species might exert female mate choice for different reasons, one of them the aim of avoiding inbreeding. In this study I examine the implication of inbreeding avoidance as a mechanism driving female mate choice in Verreaux’s sifaka lemurs (Propithecus verreauxi). In fact, in this species females are dominant and appear to be able to choose certain males to mate with, while observations indicate that rank, body size, canine size and proportions of fights won are not factors influencing female mate choice. So I hypothesized that females mate choice is driven by inbreeding avoidance in Verreaux’s sifaka lemurs. Tissue and fecal samples were collected in the Kirindy Mitea National Park in western Madagascar as a source of DNA. Parentage was assigned for a sample of the population and relatedness coefficients between dams and sires were estimated and compared to those of between random female and male pairs, dams and other candidate sires within the population and within the groups were the offspring were conceived. I found that there were no significant differences in none of the comparisons which means that Verreaux’s sifaka females do not mate more with males that are more distantly related to them. I concluded that inbreeding avoidance does not appear to be the main force driving female mate choice in Verreaux’s sifaka lemurs and I addressed explanations for these findings. With this study I contribute to our knowledge of female mate choice in lemurs.

Modeling habits as self-sustaining patterns of sensorimotor behavior

In the recent history of psychology and cognitive neuroscience, the notion of habit has been reduced to a stimulus-triggered response probability correlation. In this paper we use a computational model to present an alternative theoretical view (with some philosophical implications), where habits are seen as self-maintaining patterns of behavior that share properties in common with self-maintaining biological processes, and that inhabit a complex ecological context, including the presence and influence of other habits. Far from mechanical automatisms, this organismic and self-organizing concept of habit can overcome the dominating atomistic and statistical conceptions, and the high temporal resolution effects of situatedness, embodiment and sensorimotor loops emerge as playing a more central, subtle and complex role in the organization of behavior. The model is based on a novel "iterant deformable sensorimotor medium (IDSM)," designed such that trajectories taken through sensorimotor-space increase the likelihood that in the future, similar trajectories will be taken. We couple the IDSM to sensors and motors of a simulated robot, and show that under certain conditions, the IDSM conditions, the IDSM forms self-maintaining patterns of activity that operate across the IDSM, the robot's body, and the environment. We present various environments and the resulting habits that form in them. The model acts as an abstraction of habits at a much needed sensorimotor "meso-scale" between microscopic neuron-based models and macroscopic descriptions of behavior. Finally, we discuss how this model and extensions of it can help us understand aspects of behavioral self-organization, historicity and autonomy that remain out of the scope of contemporary representationalist frameworks.