To appove or not to approve: this is not the only question

This paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can express neither a negative opinion nor an opinion on more than one candidate. Approval voting partially fills this gap by asking an opinion on all candidates. Still the choice is only between approval and non approval. However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of suffcient knowledge for approving the candidate. In this paper we characterize the dis&approval voting rule, a natural extension of approval voting that distinguishes between indifference and disapproval.

Preferences, actions and voting rules

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for "manipulability" (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

Turnout Intention and Social Networks

How can networking affect the turnout in an election? We present a simple model to explain turnout as a result of a dynamic process of formation of the intention to vote within Erdös-Renyi random networks. Citizens have fixed preferences for one of two parties and are embedded in a given social network. They decide whether or not to vote on the basis of the attitude of their immediate contacts. They may simply follow the behavior of the majority (followers) or make an adaptive local calculus of voting (Downsian behavior). So they either have the intention of voting when the majority of their neighbors are willing to vote too, or they vote when they perceive in their social neighborhood that elections are "close". We study the long run average turnout, interpreted as the actual turnout observed in an election. Depending on the combination of values of the two key parameters, the average connectivity and the probability of behaving as a follower or in a Downsian fashion, the system exhibits monostability (zero turnout), bistability (zero turnout and either moderate or high turnout) or tristability (zero, moderate and high turnout). This means, in particular, that for a wide range of values of both parameters, we obtain realistic turnout rates, i.e. between 50% and 90%.

Sociedades Cooperativas. Aspectos Contables Singulares

[ES] Las sociedades cooperativas han visto recientemente reforzada su normativa contable con la aprobación de la ORDEN ECO/3614/2003 que tiene por objeto la adaptación de las Normas de valoración y elaboración de cuentas anuales aprobada en el Plan General de Contabilidad a las características de estas entidades.

Capacidad informativa de los resultados contables en la empresa familiar

[ES] El presente trabajo analiza la relación entre el control familiar y la credibilidad de los resultados contables. Utilizando un panel de datos de empresas españolas cotizadas no financieras para el período 1997-2003, los resultados alcanzados muestran que la credibilidad de la información contable de la empresa familiar es inferior a la de la no familiar. Asimismo, el incremento de los derechos de voto en manos del último propietario familiar incide negativamente en la credibilidad de sus resultados divulgados. Las únicas empresas en las que la naturaleza familiar incide positivamente en la credibilidad de la información contable son aquellas en las que el presidente del consejo de administración no pertenece a la familia controladora.

Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals

The Random Utility Model (RUM) of voting behavior can account for strategic voting by making use of proxy indicators that measure voter incentives to vote strategically. The contribution of this paper is to propose a new method to estimate the RUM in the presence of strategic voters, without having to construct proxy measures of strategic voting incentives. Our method can be used to infer the counterfactual sincere vote of those who vote strategically and provides an estimate of the size of strategic voting. We illustrate the procedure using post-electoral survey data from Spain. Our calculations indicate that strategic voting in Spain is about 2.19 per cent

La experiencia como base en la metodología aplicada al desarrollo rural del País Vasco

[EUS] Experitentzia, Eukal Autonomi Erkideko nekazal zonaldeen garapeneko metodologiaren oinarria. Nekazal zonaldeen garapenerako legearen onarpenaren hamarkada baten ondoren, non administrazioaren artean eta Eskualde Planaren bitartez ekiteko eredua definitzen zen, programen gauzapenean hutsune haundiak antzematen dira. Planak berritzeko helburuarekin egindako akatzen inguruan gogoeta bat burutzen da eta metodologi proposamen ezberdinak planteatzen dira. Hauen artean aurreko planen zehaztapen eta konpromesuz kale egin zuten izaera partizipatibo eta irikiaren aurrean asmo induktiboak, erabilgarriak eta ejekutagarriak proposatzen dira orain.

The Cancun Climate Summit: a Moderate Success

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Reform of Spain's profesional services market: Implementation of the EU Services Directive

The implementation of the European Commission Services Directive initiated the modernization process of services markets within the European Union. The objective was to guarantee the creation of a single market by ensuring the freedom of establishment and circulation. The transposition of the Directive in Spain triggered an initial wave of reforms in the Spanish legal system. A second package of reforms is currently underway, following recommendations by the EC, IMF and OECD, which highlight the relative lack of competition in Spain’s services as one of the major imbalances in its economy, alongside the public deficit and unemployment. Both the implemented and planned reforms represent a major step forward. Nevertheless, the government has recently announced modifications to the draft bill of the Professional Services and Associations Law, which is expected to soon be submitted for parliamentary debate and approval. Taking into consideration modifications already introduced, together with anticipated further changes, it will be important to maintain the main points of the draft bill and to introduce a deeper review of the legal framework for professional services, of the professional associations themselves, and for the activities that are subject to compulsory membership within a professional association. Spain’s territorial map of professional associations must too be redrawn.

Ghost seats in the Basque Parliament

In elections voters have generally four options: to abstain, to cast a blank vote, to cast a null vote, or to vote for a candidate or party. This last option is a positive expression of support, while the other three options reflect lack of interest, or dissatisfaction with the parties or the political system. However only votes for parties or candidates are taken into account in the apportionment method. In particular the number of seats allocated to parties remains constant even if the number of non votes (i.e. blank votes, null votes or abstention) is very large. This paper proposes to treat the non votes as a party in the apportionment method and to leave empty the corresponding seats. These empty seats are referred to as "ghost seats". How this would affect the decision-making is quantified in terms of power indices. We apply this proposal to a case study:the regional Parliament of the Basque Autonomous Community (Spain) from 1980 till 2012.

Información del Capital Humano: la generación de intangibles y la responsabilidad social

[ES] Los recursos de naturaleza intangible se han convertido en los bienes más importantes que poseen las empresas para generar riqueza de manera sostenible, en concreto el Capital Humano. Sin embargo, el éxito y supervivencia de la empresa se encuentra sometida a la aprobación de sus grupos de interés (stakeholders). Por ello, las empresas deben adoptar medidas para garantizar que sus actuaciones sean percibidas por sus stakeholders como legítimas; una manera para legitimarse es mediante el suministro de información voluntaria. Por tanto, bajo el marco de la Teoría de la Legitimidad y de los Stakeholders, nuestro objetivo es analizar cómo las empresas españolas están informando de manera voluntaria sobre su Capital Humano en los informes anuales, desde una doble perspectiva informativa: la generación de intangibles (conocimiento) y la responsabilidad social. Así, usando la metodología del análisis de contenido, la evidencia empírica muestra que las empresas españolas suministran escasa información acerca de su Capital Humano, siendo los temas relacionados con la formación y el desarrollo de los empleados los más divulgados. No obstante, y con respecto a la responsabilidad social, hay que destacar la tendencia alcista por parte de las empresas a suministrar información relativa a la política de igualdad y diversidad, la prevención de riesgos laborales y las relaciones entre empleadores y empleados.