Methods for Measuring Aggregate Costs of Conflict

This paper reviews the methods for measuring the economic cost of conflict. Estimating the economic costs of conflict requires a counterfactual calculation, which makes this a very difficult task. Social researchers have resorted to different estimation methods depending on the particular effect in question. The method used in each case depends on the units being analyzed (firms, sectors, regions or countries), the outcome variable under study (aggregate output, market valuation of firms, market shares, etc.) and data availability (a single cross-section, time series or panel data). This paper reviews existing methods used in the literature to assess the economic impact of conflict: cost accounting, cross-section methods, time series methods, panel data methods, gravity models, event studies, natural experiments and comparative case studies. The paper ends with a discussion of cost estimates and directions for further research.

La representación de las élites locales y provinciales en los homenajes hispanos: la distinción honorífica pública y la intervención privada

Homenaje al Dr. Armin U. Stylow.

Are Bar Associations Anticompetitive? An Empirical Analysis of Recommended Prices for Legal Services in Spain

The European Commission Report on Competition in Professional Services found that recommended prices by professional bodies have a significant negative effect on competition since they may facilitate the coordination of prices between service providers and/or mislead consumers about reasonable price levels. Professional associations argue, first, that a fee schedule may help their members to properly calculate the cost of services avoiding excessive charges and reducing consumers’ searching costs and, second, that recommended prices are very useful for cost appraisal if a litigant is condemned to pay the legal expenses of the opposing party. Thus, recommended fee schedules could be justified to some extent if they represented the cost of providing the services. We test this hypothesis using cross‐section data on a subset of recommended prices by 52 Spanish bar associations and cost data on their territorial jurisdictions. Our empirical results indicate that prices recommended by bar associations are unrelated to the cost of legal services and therefore we conclude that recommended prices have merely an anticompetitive effect.