Cost-Saving production technologies and strategic delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms that produce a differentiated good can choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the latter. By giving managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we find that Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology than the strict profit maximization case. However, the results may be reversed under Cournot competition. We show that if the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently low (high), the incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology is larger under strict profit maximization (strategic delegation).

Interdisciplinary experience in the Teacher Training College of Vitoria-Gasteiz: teaching profession module

[EN] The higher education regulation process in Europe, known as the Bologna Process, has involved many changes, mainly in relation to methodology and assessment. The paper given below relates to implementing the new EU study plans into the Teacher Training College of Vitoria-Gasteiz; it is the first interdisciplinary paper written involving teaching staff and related to the Teaching Profession module, the first contained in the structure of the new plans. The coordination of teaching staff is one of the main lines of work in the Bologna Process, which is also essential to develop the right skills and maximise the role of students as an active learning component. The use of active, interdisciplinary methodologies has opened up a new dimension in universities, requiring the elimination of the once componential, individual structure, making us look for new areas of exchange that make it possible for students' training to be developed jointly.