Playing games with words cultural transfer in David Lynch's Blue Velvet

Eguíluz, Federico; Merino, Raquel; Olsen, Vickie; Pajares, Eterio; Santamaría, José Miguel (eds.)

The use of role-play games in teaching: The International Climate Negotiation Game

This paper presents a role-play game designed by the authors, which focuses on international climate negotiations. The game has been used at a university with students all drawn from the same course and at summer schools with students from different levels (undergraduate, master’s and doctoral students and post-doctoral researchers) and different knowledge areas (economics, law, engineering, architecture, biology and others). We discuss how the game fits into the process of competence-based learning, and what benefits games, and role-play games in particular, have for teaching. In the game, students take on the role of representatives of national institutions and experience at first hand a detailed process of international negotiation concerned with climate change.

ADAPTECC: A Role-Play Game about Adapting to Climate Change

The ADAPTECC Climate Change Adaptation Game is a role-play game designed to enable players to experience the difficulties that arise at local and regional levels when authorities have to implement adaptation measures. Adaptation means anticipating the advert effects of climate change (CC) and taking measures to prevent and minimise the damage caused by its impacts. Each player takes the role of the mayor or a councillor of a town affected by CC who must decide what adaptation strategies and measures to take, or of a member of the Regional Environment Department which must distribute funding for adaptation among the various towns. At the end of the game, players should have a greater understanding of the challenges posed by adaptation to CC

El uso de juegos de Rol en la docencia: el juego de la Negociación Climática Internacional

En este artículo presentamos un juego de rol sobre negociación climática internacional que ha sido diseñado por los autores. El juego ha sido utilizado tanto en la universidad, con alumnos que están cursando los mismos estudios, como en cursos de verano con alumnos de diferentes niveles de formación (estudiantes de grado o master, estudiantes de doctorado e investigadores postdoctorales) y áreas de conocimiento (economía, derecho, ingeniería, arquitectura, biología,.. etc.). Se muestra, además, cómo encaja el juego en el proceso de aprendizaje por competencias, así como los beneficios que tiene el uso de juegos, y concretamente juegos de rol o “role-playing” en la docencia. A través del juego, los alumnos asumen el rol de representante institucional de un país y viven, en primera persona, los pormenores de una negociación internacional sobre Cambio Climático.

Errespetua, autonomia eta bizikidetza arauak hezkuntzan lantzeko proposamena

[EUS] Balioek eta jarrerek garrantzia handia dute edozein testuingurutan. Hori dela eta, lan hau Lehen Hezkuntzako lehenengo mailan errespetua, autonomia eta bizikidetza arauak lantzeko proposamena da, ikasleen balio eta jarreretan aldaketa eta hobekuntza jakina eragiteko asmoz. Oinarri teoriko batetik sortutako esku-hartzeak, 12 jarduera ditu, pre-testa, post-testa eta balioak bizirik irauteko amaierako rol-jokoa, beste batzuen artean. Praktikan jarritako interbentziotik emaitzak eta ondorioak atera dira, proposatutakoak ikasleengan zer-nolako eragina izan duen eta ondorioz, haien ezaugarrietarako egokia izan den azalduz, besteak beste.

Unraveling Public Good Games: The Role of Priors

This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects\' beliefs on contributions and allow us to conclude that, firstly, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, secondly, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end game effects and there is very little updating of beliefs.

Games with perceptions

We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.