Cost-Saving production technologies and strategic delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms that produce a differentiated good can choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the latter. By giving managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we find that Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology than the strict profit maximization case. However, the results may be reversed under Cournot competition. We show that if the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently low (high), the incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology is larger under strict profit maximization (strategic delegation).

Dinámica de las Redes Virtuales de Fabricación Global en la Industria Aeronáutica

[ES] Las redes virtuales de fabricación global (RVFGs) están formadas por empresas independientes las cuales establecen entre sí relaciones de tipo horizontal y vertical, pudiendo incluso ser competidores, donde no es necesario mantener internamente grandes recursos fabriles sino gestionar y compartir eficientemente los recursos de la red.

Climate change impacts on the water services in Costa Rica: a production function for the hydroenergy sector

23 p.

Local air pollution and global climate change taxes: a distributional analysis

25 p.