23 resultados para perfect hedging
em Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación - Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad del País Vasco
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Cadmium (Cd) is a toxic, biologically non-essential and highly mobile metal that has become an increasingly important environmental hazard to both wildlife and humans. In contrast to conventional remediation technologies, phytoremediation based on legume rhizobia symbiosis has emerged as an inexpensive decontamination alternative which also revitalize contaminated soils due to the role of legumes in nitrogen cycling. In recent years, there is a growing interest in understanding symbiotic legume rhizobia relationship and its interactions with Cd. The aim of the present review is to provide a comprehensive picture of the main effects of Cd in N-2-fixing leguminous plants and the benefits of exploiting this symbiosis together with plant growth promoting rhizobacteria to boost an efficient reclamation of Cd-contaminated soils.
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Binmore and Samuelson (1999) have shown that perturbations (drift) are crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria. We contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift. In particular, this article introduces a microeconomic model of drift based on the similarity theory developed by Tversky (1977), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Rubinstein (1988),(1998). An innovation with respect to those works is that we deal with similarity relations that are derived from the perception that each agent has about how well he is playing the game. In addition, the similarity relations are adapted to a dynamic setting. We obtain different models of drift depending on how we model the agent´s assessment of his behaviour in the game. The examples of the ultimatum game and the chain-store game are used to show the conditions for each model to stabilize elements in the component of Nash equilibria that are not subgame- perfect. It is also shown how some models approximate the laboratory data about those games while others match the data.
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Revised: 2006-07
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Ideally we would like subjects of experiments to be perfect strangers so that the situation they face at the lab is not just part of a long run interaction. Unfortunately, it is not easy to reach those conditions and experimenters try to mitigate any effects from those out-of-the-lab relationships by, for instance, randomly matching subjects. However, even if this type of procedure is used, there is a positive probability that a subject may face a friend or an acquaintance. We find evidence that social proximity between subjects is irrelevant to experiment results in dictator games. Thus, although ideal conditions are not met, relations between subjects do not contaminate the results of experiments.
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Published as an article in: Investigaciones Economicas, 2005, vol. 29, issue 3, pages 483-523.
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Published as an article in: Journal of Monetary Economics, 2003, vol. 50, issue 6, pages 1311-1331.
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In this paper we introduce four scenario Cluster based Lagrangian Decomposition (CLD) procedures for obtaining strong lower bounds to the (optimal) solution value of two-stage stochastic mixed 0-1 problems. At each iteration of the Lagrangian based procedures, the traditional aim consists of obtaining the solution value of the corresponding Lagrangian dual via solving scenario submodels once the nonanticipativity constraints have been dualized. Instead of considering a splitting variable representation over the set of scenarios, we propose to decompose the model into a set of scenario clusters. We compare the computational performance of the four Lagrange multiplier updating procedures, namely the Subgradient Method, the Volume Algorithm, the Progressive Hedging Algorithm and the Dynamic Constrained Cutting Plane scheme for different numbers of scenario clusters and different dimensions of the original problem. Our computational experience shows that the CLD bound and its computational effort depend on the number of scenario clusters to consider. In any case, our results show that the CLD procedures outperform the traditional LD scheme for single scenarios both in the quality of the bounds and computational effort. All the procedures have been implemented in a C++ experimental code. A broad computational experience is reported on a test of randomly generated instances by using the MIP solvers COIN-OR and CPLEX for the auxiliary mixed 0-1 cluster submodels, this last solver within the open source engine COIN-OR. We also give computational evidence of the model tightening effect that the preprocessing techniques, cut generation and appending and parallel computing tools have in stochastic integer optimization. Finally, we have observed that the plain use of both solvers does not provide the optimal solution of the instances included in the testbed with which we have experimented but for two toy instances in affordable elapsed time. On the other hand the proposed procedures provide strong lower bounds (or the same solution value) in a considerably shorter elapsed time for the quasi-optimal solution obtained by other means for the original stochastic problem.
Materiales vascos del legado de Wilhelm von Humboldt: la relevancia de Astarloa y el Plan de Lenguas
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Este artículo es traducción del original alemán «Zum Stellenwert Astarloas und des Plan de Lenguas», publicado en B. Hurch (ed.), Die baskischen Materialien aus dem Nachlaß Wilhelm von Humboldts. Astarloa, Charpentier, Fréret, Aizpitarte und anderes. Paderborn: Schöningh, pp. 21-42. La traducción al español es obra de Oroitz Jauregi y ha sido revisada por Ricardo Gómez y Bernhard Hurch.
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This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark models by Bala and Goyal, the one-way flow model, and the two-way flow model, and includes both as particular extreme cases. As in both benchmark models, in what we call an "asymmetric flow" network a link can be initiated unilaterally by any player with any other, and the flow through a link towards the player who supports it is perfect. Unlike those models, in the opposite direction there is friction or decay. When this decay is complete there is no flow and this corresponds to the one-way flow model. The limit case when the decay in the opposite direction (and asymmetry) disappears, corresponds to the two-way flow model. We characterize stable and strictly stable architectures for the whole range of parameters of this "intermediate" and more general model. We also prove the convergence of Bala and Goyal's dynamic model in this context.
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Optimal management in a multi-cohort Beverton-Holt model with any number of age classes and imperfect selectivity is equivalent to finding the optimal fish lifespan by chosen fallow cycles. Optimal policy differs in two main ways from the optimal lifespan rule with perfect selectivity. First, weight gain is valued in terms of the whole population structure. Second, the cost of waiting is the interest rate adjusted for the increase in the pulse length. This point is especially relevant for assessing the role of selectivity. Imperfect selectivity reduces the optimal lifespan and the optimal pulse length. We illustrate our theoretical findings with a numerical example. Results obtained using global numerical methods select the optimal pulse length predicted by the optimal lifespan rule.
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Fundamentally, action potentials in the squid axon are consequence of the entrance of sodium ions during the depolarization of the rising phase of the spike mediated by the outflow of potassium ions during the hyperpolarization of the falling phase. Perfect metabolic efficiency with a minimum charge needed for the change in voltage during the action potential would confine sodium entry to the rising phase and potassium efflux to the falling phase. However, because sodium channels remain open to a significant extent during the falling phase, a certain overlap of inward and outward currents is observed. In this work we investigate the impact of ion overlap on the number of the adenosine triphosphate (ATP) molecules and energy cost required per action potential as a function of the temperature in a Hodgkin–Huxley model. Based on a recent approach to computing the energy cost of neuronal action potential generation not based on ion counting, we show that increased firing frequencies induced by higher temperatures imply more efficient use of sodium entry, and then a decrease in the metabolic energy cost required to restore the concentration gradients after an action potential. Also, we determine values of sodium conductance at which the hydrolysis efficiency presents a clear minimum.
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This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.
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In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might simply unexpectedly forget what they previously observed (but not chose). Following this idea, this paper drops the assumption that the information structure of extensive-form games is commonly known; that is, it introduces uncertainty into players' capacity to observe each others' past choices. Using this approach, our main result provides the following epistemic characterisation: if players (i) are rational,(ii) have strong belief in both opponents' rationality and opponents' capacity to observe others' choices, and (iii) have common belief in both opponents' future rationality and op-ponents' future capacity to observe others' choices, then the backward induction outcome obtains. Consequently, we do not require perfect information, and players observing each others' choices is often irrelevant from a strategic point of view. The analysis extends {from generic games with perfect information to games with not necessarily perfect information{the work by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Perea (2014), who provide different sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome.
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122 p.
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190 p.