Long Term Dynamics in CO2 Allowance Prices and Carbon Capture Investments

In this paper we analyse the behaviour of the EU market for CO2 emission allowances; specifically, we focus on the contracts maturing in the Kyoto Protocol's second period of application (2008 to 2012). We calibrate the underlying parameters for the allowance price in the long run and we also calibrate those from the Spanish wholesale electricity market. This information is then used to assess the option to install a carbon capture and storage (CCS) unit in a coal-fired power plant. We use a two-dimensional binomial lattice where costs and profits are valued and the optimal investment time is determined. In other words, we study the trigger allowance prices above which it is optimal to install the capture unit immediately. We further analyse the impact of several variables on the critical prices, among them allowance price volatility and a hypothetical government subsidy. We conclude that, at current permit prices, from a financial point of view, immediate installation does not seem justified. This need not be the case, though, if carbon market parameters change dramatically and/or a specific policy to promote these units is adopted.

Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

Education and the dynamics of family decisions

This paper investigates the extent to which a biased transmission of educational endowments affects fertility. To this end, we devise a version of Becker’s family decision model that takes preference change into account. Specifically, we model education as an instrument that increases the autonomy (to prefer), and autonomy as an instrument of preference-change for household-structures. The empirical validity of the proposed model is examined for the European setting using the European Community Household Panel. In the context of the model, empirical findings imply the following. On the one hand, both preference for quantity and preference for bequest for each offspring (quality) increases with education, while preference for current consumption decreases. On the other hand, education is found to be negatively correlated with fertility, at a decreasing rate. Therefore, the paper provides a useful additional toolkit for public policy evaluation. It explains how public policies oriented toward the guarantee of personal freedoms, such as the expansion of education and autonomy, are likely to guarantee the same freedoms for subsequent generations.

Structural relaxation and chain dynamics in polymer melts : a computational investigation on the role of the intramolecular barriers

149 p. : il. col.

The structure and the dynamics of poly(vinyl methyl ether) PVME and in PVME concentrated water solution : a study by neutron scattering and fully atomistic molecular dynamics simulations

175 p. : il.

Dynamics of pneumococcal nasopharyngeal carriage in healthy children attending a day care center in northern Spain. Influence of detection techniques on the results

8 p.

Emergence of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Population: A Discrete-Time Replicator Dynamics Analysis

The emergence of cooperation is analyzed in heterogeneous populations where individuals can be classified in two groups according to their phenotypic appearance. Phenotype recognition is assumed for all individuals: individuals are able to identify the type of every other individual, but fail to recognize their own type, and thus behave under partial information conditions. The interactions between individuals are described by 2 × 2 symmetric games where individuals can either cooperate or defect. The evolution of such populations is studied in the framework of evolutionary game by means of the replicator dynamics. Overlapping generations are considered, so the replicator equations are formulated in discrete-time form. The well-posedness conditions of the system are derived. Depending on the parameters of the game, a restriction may exist for the generation length. The stability analysis of the dynamical system is carried out and a detailed description of the behavior of trajectories starting from the interior of the state-space is given. We find that, provided the conditions of well-posedness are verified, the linear stability of monomorphic states in the discrete-time replicator coincides with the one of the continuous case. Specific from the discrete-time case, a relaxed restriction for the generation length is derived, for which larger time-steps can be used without compromising the well-posedness of the replicator system.