Decomposing the Gender Wage Gap: The effect of firms, occupations and Job Stratification

This paper presents new evidence on the role of segregation into firms, occupations within a firm and stratification into professional categories within firm-occupations in explaining the gender wage gap. I use a generalized earnings model that allows observed and unobserved group characteristics to have different impact on wages of men and women within the same group. The database is a large sample of individual wage data from the 1995 Spanish Wage Structure Survey. Results indicate that firm segregation in our sample accounts for around one-fifth of the raw gender wage gap. Occupational segregation within firms accounts for about one-third of the raw wage gap, and stratification into different professional categories within firms and occupations explains another one-third of it. The remaining one-fifth of the overall gap arises from better outcomes of men relative to women within professional categories. It is also found that rewards to both observable and unobservable skills, particularly those related to education, are higher for males than for females within the same group. Finally, mean wages in occupations or job categories with a higher fraction of female co-workers are lower, but the negative impact of femaleness in higher for women.

Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis

We consider a job contest in which candidates go through interviews (cheap talk) and are subject to reference checks. We show how competitive pressure - increasing the ratio of "good" to "bad" type candi- dates - can lead to a vast increase in lying and in some cases make bad hires more likely. As the number of candidates increases, it becomes harder to in- duce truth-telling. The interview stage becomes redundant if the candidates, a priori, know each others' type or the result of their own reference check. Finally, we show that the employer can bene t from committing not to reject all the applicants.

Games with perceptions

We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.