Euskal Herriko Ekonomi Egitura

Dokumentu honetan Euskadiko Ekonomiaren Egituraz hitz egingo dugu, baina kontzeptu berezi batean fokatuta: berrikuntza. Lehenik XVII, XVIII eta XIX. mendeetan zehar Euskadiko Ekonomiaren Egiturak jasan dituen aldaketak errepasatuko ditugu, Euskadiko ekonomian eman ziren aldaketarik garrantzitsuenak aipatuz eta Euskadiko Ekonomiaren Egitura urte horietan aztertuz. Geroago, XX. mendea sakonki aztertuko dugu, mende oso garrantzitsua izan baitzen euskal ekonomiarentzat eta denboran hurbilen daukaguna delako. Jarraian XXI. mendeko lehen urteetan euskal ekonomian eman diren gora beherak aztertuko ditugu. Eta azkenik, lehen aipatu dugun moduan, berrikuntzaren kontzeptuan murgilduko gara. Euskal ekonomiak kontzeptu honetara zelan moldatu den aztertuko dugu, honek ekonomian izan dituen ondorioak eta etorkizuna zelakoa izango den hausnartzen saiatuko gara. Azken zati honekin batera enpresa zehatz baten kasua aztertuko dugu (Graphenea enpresa), Euskadiko Ekonomiaren Egiturak azken urteetan izan dituen aldaketek enpresa baten izan ditzaketen ondorioak aztertu ahal izateko. Honekin batera, lan honetan zehar aipatuko ditugun ezaugarri ezberdinak merkatuan dagoen enpresa batekin aztertzea lortu nahi dugu, kasu praktiko honetaz baliatuz.

Profit as Cost versus Profit as Surplus over Cost: A Case Study on Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics"

On the analysis of Varian’s textbook on Microeconomics, which I take to be a representative of the standard view, I argue that Varian provides two contrary notions of profit, namely, profit as surplus over cost and profit as cost. Varian starts by defining profit as the surplus of revenues over cost and, thus, as the part of the value of commodities that is not any cost; however, he provides a second definition of profit as a cost, namely, as the opportunity cost of capital. I also argue that the definition of competitive profit as the opportunity cost of capital involves a self-contradictory notion of opportunity cost.

Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population

Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.