Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis

We consider a job contest in which candidates go through interviews (cheap talk) and are subject to reference checks. We show how competitive pressure - increasing the ratio of "good" to "bad" type candi- dates - can lead to a vast increase in lying and in some cases make bad hires more likely. As the number of candidates increases, it becomes harder to in- duce truth-telling. The interview stage becomes redundant if the candidates, a priori, know each others' type or the result of their own reference check. Finally, we show that the employer can bene t from committing not to reject all the applicants.

A Game-Theoreteic Analysis of Minority Language Use in Multilingual Societies

This chapter studies multilingual democratic societies with highly developed economies. These societies are assumed to have two languages with official status: language A, spoken by every individual, and language B, spoken by the bilingual minority. We emphasize that language rights are important, but the survival of the minority language B depends mainly on the actual use bilinguals make of B. The purpose of the present chapter is to study some of the factors affecting the bilingual speakers language choice behaviour. Our view is that languages with their speech communities compete for speakers just as fi rms compete for market share. Thus, the con ict among the minority languages in these societies does not take the rough expressions such as those studied in Desmet et al. (2012). Here the con flict is more subtle. We model highly plausible language choice situations by means of choice procedures and non-cooperative games, each with different types of information. We then study the determinants of the bilinguals ' strategic behaviour with regard to language. We observe that the bilinguals' use of B is shaped, essentially, by linguistic conventions and social norms that are developed in situations of language contact.

Personal identity. A theoretical and experimental analysis

Published as article in: Journal of Economic Methodology, 2010, vol. 17, issue 3, pages 261-275.

Emergence of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Population: A Discrete-Time Replicator Dynamics Analysis

The emergence of cooperation is analyzed in heterogeneous populations where individuals can be classified in two groups according to their phenotypic appearance. Phenotype recognition is assumed for all individuals: individuals are able to identify the type of every other individual, but fail to recognize their own type, and thus behave under partial information conditions. The interactions between individuals are described by 2 × 2 symmetric games where individuals can either cooperate or defect. The evolution of such populations is studied in the framework of evolutionary game by means of the replicator dynamics. Overlapping generations are considered, so the replicator equations are formulated in discrete-time form. The well-posedness conditions of the system are derived. Depending on the parameters of the game, a restriction may exist for the generation length. The stability analysis of the dynamical system is carried out and a detailed description of the behavior of trajectories starting from the interior of the state-space is given. We find that, provided the conditions of well-posedness are verified, the linear stability of monomorphic states in the discrete-time replicator coincides with the one of the continuous case. Specific from the discrete-time case, a relaxed restriction for the generation length is derived, for which larger time-steps can be used without compromising the well-posedness of the replicator system.

Exploring Game Performance in the National Basketball Association Using Player Tracking Data

Recent player tracking technology provides new information about basketball game performance. The aim of this study was to (i) compare the game performances of all-star and non all-star basketball players from the National Basketball Association (NBA), and (ii) describe the different basketball game performance profiles based on the different game roles. Archival data were obtained from all 2013-2014 regular season games (n = 1230). The variables analyzed included the points per game, minutes played and the game actions recorded by the player tracking system. To accomplish the first aim, the performance per minute of play was analyzed using a descriptive discriminant analysis to identify which variables best predict the all-star and non all-star playing categories. The all-star players showed slower velocities in defense and performed better in elbow touches, defensive rebounds, close touches, close points and pull-up points, possibly due to optimized attention processes that are key for perceiving the required appropriate environmental information. The second aim was addressed using a k-means cluster analysis, with the aim of creating maximal different performance profile groupings. Afterwards, a descriptive discriminant analysis identified which variables best predict the different playing clusters. The results identified different playing profile of performers, particularly related to the game roles of scoring, passing, defensive and all-round game behavior. Coaching staffs may apply this information to different players, while accounting for individual differences and functional variability, to optimize practice planning and, consequently, the game performances of individuals and teams.