Gizarte-elkarrekintza eta harreman beharrizanak irakaste-ikaste prozesuetan Haur Hezkuntzan

LABURPENA: Lan hau esku-hartzearen alorrean kokatzen da: harreman beharrizanen inguruko diagnostiko bat aurkezten da. Honen helburua da Haur Hezkuntzako 3 urteko gelan edukiak irakasteko eta ikasteko antolatzen den gizarte-elkarrekintzan agertzen diren harreman beharrizan motak eta horiek noraino eta nola betetzen diren ikustea. Esku-hartzea oinarritzen da orientabide soziokulturalaren konstruktibismoak gizarte-elkarrekintzari buruz egin duen lanean eta baita Garapenaren Psikologiak eta beste diziplina batzuk atxikimenduaz eta harreman afektiboei buruz aztertutakoan ere. Diagnostikoa egiteko prozedura etnografikoak erabili dira, garrantzitsuena behaketa parte-hartzailea. Ondorioetan nabarmenena da eduki eskolarren presioak maiz harreman beharrizanei ez erantzutera eramaten duela eta baita autonomia isolamendu afektiboekin identifikatzen dela ziurtasunaren premiaren kalterako. Azkenik, lan egiteko orduan baliogarriak izan daitezkeen jarraitzeko ildo batzuk nabariak dira.

A Behavioral Foundation for Models of Evolutionary Drift

Binmore and Samuelson (1999) have shown that perturbations (drift) are crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria. We contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift. In particular, this article introduces a microeconomic model of drift based on the similarity theory developed by Tversky (1977), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Rubinstein (1988),(1998). An innovation with respect to those works is that we deal with similarity relations that are derived from the perception that each agent has about how well he is playing the game. In addition, the similarity relations are adapted to a dynamic setting. We obtain different models of drift depending on how we model the agent´s assessment of his behaviour in the game. The examples of the ultimatum game and the chain-store game are used to show the conditions for each model to stabilize elements in the component of Nash equilibria that are not subgame- perfect. It is also shown how some models approximate the laboratory data about those games while others match the data.

Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

The First Occurrence in the Fossil Record of an Aquatic Avian Twig-Nest with Phoenicopteriformes Eggs: Evolutionary Implication

14 p.

Molecular ecology of european mustelids: Unraveling evolutionary and ecological patterns in Martes and Lutra genera

208 p.

Systematic and evolutionary studies of the terrestrial gastropods Helicoidea and Pyramidula

178 p.

Ethnography as a linking method between psychology and sociology: research design

World Conference on Psychology and Sociology 2012