Unraveling Public Good Games: The Role of Priors

This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects\' beliefs on contributions and allow us to conclude that, firstly, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, secondly, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end game effects and there is very little updating of beliefs.

On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players

We characterize a monotonic core concept defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core concepts for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the nucleolus per capita is not monotonic.

A Behavioral Foundation for Models of Evolutionary Drift

Binmore and Samuelson (1999) have shown that perturbations (drift) are crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria. We contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift. In particular, this article introduces a microeconomic model of drift based on the similarity theory developed by Tversky (1977), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Rubinstein (1988),(1998). An innovation with respect to those works is that we deal with similarity relations that are derived from the perception that each agent has about how well he is playing the game. In addition, the similarity relations are adapted to a dynamic setting. We obtain different models of drift depending on how we model the agent´s assessment of his behaviour in the game. The examples of the ultimatum game and the chain-store game are used to show the conditions for each model to stabilize elements in the component of Nash equilibria that are not subgame- perfect. It is also shown how some models approximate the laboratory data about those games while others match the data.

The Supercore for Normal Form Games

We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the last game in the sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nash equilibria. For games with an infinite number of Nash equilibria this need not be no longer the case. Yet, it is not difficult to find a binary relation which guarantees the coincidence of these two sets.

Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

Dynamic Inefficiency in an Overlapping Generation Economy with Pollution and Health Costs

Revised 2008-08.-- Published as an article in: Journal of Public Economic Theory (2008), 10(4), 563-594.

The Evaluation of Fisheries Management: A Dynamic Stochastic Approach

In this article, we analyze how to evaluate fishery resource management under “ecological uncertainty”. In this context, an efficient policy consists of applying a different exploitation rule depending on the state of the resource and we could say that the stock is always in transition, jumping from one steady state to another. First, we propose a method for calibrating the growth path of the resource such that observed dynamics of resource and captures are matched. Second, we apply the calibration procedure proposed in two different fishing grounds: the European Anchovy (Division VIII) and the Southern Stock of Hake. Our results show that the role played by uncertainty is essential for the conclusions. For European Anchovy fishery (Division VIII) we find, in contrast with Del Valle et al. (2001), that this is not an overexploited fishing ground. However, we show that the Southern Stock of Hake is in a dangerous situation. In both cases our results are in accordance with ICES advice.

Pension system's reform in Spain: a dynamic analysis of the effects in Welfare

100 p. : graf.

Dynamic optimization of track components to minimize rail corrugation

In this paper, the influence on corrugation of the most significant track parameters has been examined. After this parametric study, the optimization of the track parameters to minimize the undulatory wear growth has been achieved. Finally, the influence of the dispersion of the track and contact parameters on corrugation growth has been studied. A method has been developed to obtain an optimal solution of the track parameters which minimizes corrugation growth, thus ensuring that this solution remains optimum despite dispersion of track parameters and wheel-rail contact uncertainties. This work is based on the computer application RACING (RAil Corrugation INitiation and Growth) which has been developed by the authors to predict rail corrugation features.

Reference Points Based on Dynamic Optimisation: A Versatil Algorithm for Mixed Fishery Management with Bio-economic Agestructured Models

Single-species management objectives may not be consistent within mixed fisheries. They may lead species to unsafe situations, promote discarding of over-quota and/or misreporting of catches. We provide an algorithm for characterising bio-economic reference points for a mixed fishery as the steady-state solution of a dynamic optimal management problem. The optimisation problem takes into account: i) that species are fishing simultaneously in unselective fishing operations and ii)intertemporal discounting and fleet costs to relate reference points to discounted economic profits along optimal trajectories. We illustrate how the algorithm can be implemented by applying it to the European Northern Stock of Hake (Merluccius merluccius), where fleets also capture Northern megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis) and Northern anglerfish (Lophius piscatorius and Lophius budegassa). We find that optimal mixed management leads to a target reference point that is quite similar to the 2/3 of the Fmsy single-species (hake) target. Mixed management is superior to singlespecies management because it leads the fishery to higher discounted profits with higher long-term SSB for all species. We calculate that the losses due to the use of the Fmsy single-species (hake) target in this mixed fishery account for 11.4% of total discounted profits.

Moral cleansing and moral licenses: experimental evidence

Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).

Games with perceptions

We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.

A rational fraction polynomials model to study vertical dynamic wheel-rail interaction

This paper presents a model designed to study vertical interactions between wheel and rail when the wheel moves over a rail welding. The model focuses on the spatial domain, and is drawn up in a simple fashion from track receptances. The paper obtains the receptances from a full track model in the frequency domain already developed by the authors, which includes deformation of the rail section and propagation of bending, elongation and torsional waves along an infinite track. Transformation between domains was secured by applying a modified rational fraction polynomials method. This obtains a track model with very few degrees of freedom, and thus with minimum time consumption for integration, with a good match to the original model over a sufficiently broad range of frequencies. Wheel-rail interaction is modelled on a non-linear Hertzian spring, and consideration is given to parametric excitation caused by the wheel moving over a sleeper, since this is a moving wheel model and not a moving irregularity model. The model is used to study the dynamic loads and displacements emerging at the wheel-rail contact passing over a welding defect at different speeds.

The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games

We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M stable set and otherwise they have infinite sets.

Learning in Network Games

We report the findings of an experiment designed to study how people learn and make decisions in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to e.g. random matching) more rules differ in terms of their information requirements. Our experimental design enables us to observe both which actions participants choose and which information they consult before making their choices. We use this information to estimate learning types using maximum likelihood methods. There is substantial heterogeneity in learning types. However, the vast majority of our participants' decisions are best characterized by reinforcement learning or (myopic) best-response learning. The distribution of learning types seems fairly stable across contexts. Neither network topology nor the position of a player in the network seem to substantially affect the estimated distribution of learning types.