3 resultados para collateral
em Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación - Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad del País Vasco
Resumo:
Contributed to: Fusion of Cultures: XXXVIII Annual Conference on Computer Applications and Quantitative Methods in Archaeology – CAA2010 (Granada, Spain, Apr 6-9, 2010)
Resumo:
[ES] La calificación crediticia externa es un elemento clave para el buen fin de las operaciones de titulización. No obstante, las agencias de calificación han sido objeto de una intensa controversia, cuestionándose su fiabilidad y objetividad. En este trabajo abundamos en esta cuestión, analizando la distribución de los ratings otorgados a las emisiones de bonos de titulización llevadas a cabo en España (1993-2011), uno de los países más activos en cuanto al volumen de emisiones, llegaron a ocupar el segundo puesto a nivel europeo y el tercero a nivel mundial. Aportamos evidencia sobre ciertas anomalías entre las que cabe destacar la estructura oligopolística del mercado del rating, la fragilidad desde una perspectiva histórica de las calificaciones otorgadas, y la existencia de patrones no homogéneos en la elección de la agencia de calificación, tanto si se tiene en cuenta la sociedad gestora, como el colateral de respaldo.
Resumo:
[EN] Debt issue credit ratings can lead to conflicts of interest as the issuer itself is entrusted with contracting and compensating the rating agency. Into the bargain, the credit rating agency may be involved in designing the issues that the same agency subsequently rates. Credit rating agencies thus could have incentives to rate issues advantageously. Given the economic importance of this issue, in this paper we have proposed to analyze this phenomenon, known as rating shopping in academic literature, for Spanish market securitization issues for the period of time comprehensive from January 1993 to December 2011. In sum 3,665 published ratings are been analysed, for an issued nominal amount of 791,090 million Euros. The results show an association between the credit rating agency contracted and the mean rating awarded. Significant differences are observed in the ratings associated to the contracting manager (or special purpose vehicle SPV- manager firm), to the number of ratings or to the type of collateral. Furthermore, a pattern compatible with rating shopping was observed for some types of collateral: abnormally high market shares associated with certain agencies awarding unusually generous ratings. However, this phenomenon is not seen to be widespread on the rating market associated to Spanish securitization issues.