Theoretical Characterization of Pentacovalent Oxyphosphorane Intermediate Structures of the Hydrolysis of RNA catalyzed by RNase A

266 p. : il. graf.

Long memory in return structures from developed markets

[En]The present study aimed at investigating the existence of long memory properties in ten developed stock markets across the globe. When return series exhibit long memory, the series realizations are not independent over time and past returns can help predict future returns, thus violating the market efficiency hypothesis. It poses a serious challenge to the supporters of random walk behavior of the stock returns indicating a potentially predictable component in the series dynamics. We computed Hurst-Mandelbrot’s Classical R/S statistic, Lo’s statistic and semi parametric GPH statistic using spectral regression. The findings suggest existence of long memory in volatility and random walk for logarithmic return series in general for all the selected stock market indices. Findings are in line with the stylized facts of financial time series.

Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction

In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might simply unexpectedly forget what they previously observed (but not chose). Following this idea, this paper drops the assumption that the information structure of extensive-form games is commonly known; that is, it introduces uncertainty into players' capacity to observe each others' past choices. Using this approach, our main result provides the following epistemic characterisation: if players (i) are rational,(ii) have strong belief in both opponents' rationality and opponents' capacity to observe others' choices, and (iii) have common belief in both opponents' future rationality and op-ponents' future capacity to observe others' choices, then the backward induction outcome obtains. Consequently, we do not require perfect information, and players observing each others' choices is often irrelevant from a strategic point of view. The analysis extends {from generic games with perfect information to games with not necessarily perfect information{the work by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Perea (2014), who provide different sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome.

Implications of governance structures on urban climate action: evidence from Italy and Spain

47 p.