Translating Spanish Literature into English: Some cross-cultural pragmatic issues

Eterio Pajares, Raquel Merino y José Miguel Santamaría (eds.)

Multirating decision model validation: the relevance of the quality of the securitization issues

Rating enables the information asymmetry existing in the issuer-investor relationship to be reduced, particularly for issues with a high degree of complexity, as is the case of securitizations. However, there may be a serious conflict of interest between the issuer’s choice and remuneration of the agency and the credit rating awarded, resulting in lower quality and information power of the published rating. In this paper, we propose an explicative model of the number of ratings requested, by analyzing the relevance of the number of ratings to measure the reliability, where multirating is shown to be associated to the quality, size, liquidity and the degree of information asymmetry relating to the issue. Thus, we consider that the regulatory changes that foster the widespread publication of simultaneous ratings could help to alleviate the problem of rating model arbitrage and the crisis of confidence in credit ratings in general and in the securitization issues, in particular.

The DICER Model: Methodological Issues and Initial Results

31 p.

Does rating shopping exist in spanish securitization issues?

[EN] Debt issue credit ratings can lead to conflicts of interest as the issuer itself is entrusted with contracting and compensating the rating agency. Into the bargain, the credit rating agency may be involved in designing the issues that the same agency subsequently rates. Credit rating agencies thus could have incentives to rate issues advantageously. Given the economic importance of this issue, in this paper we have proposed to analyze this phenomenon, known as rating shopping in academic literature, for Spanish market securitization issues for the period of time comprehensive from January 1993 to December 2011. In sum 3,665 published ratings are been analysed, for an issued nominal amount of 791,090 million Euros. The results show an association between the credit rating agency contracted and the mean rating awarded. Significant differences are observed in the ratings associated to the contracting manager (or special purpose vehicle SPV- manager firm), to the number of ratings or to the type of collateral. Furthermore, a pattern compatible with rating shopping was observed for some types of collateral: abnormally high market shares associated with certain agencies awarding unusually generous ratings. However, this phenomenon is not seen to be widespread on the rating market associated to Spanish securitization issues.