Monte Carlo Valuation of natural gas investments

This paper deals with the valuation of energy assets related to natural gas. In particular, we evaluate a baseload Natural Gas Combined Cycle (NGCC) power plant and an ancillary instalation, namely a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility, in a realistic setting; specifically, these investments enjoy a long useful life but require some non-negligible time to build. Then we focus on the valuation of several investment options again in a realistic setting. These include the option to invest in the power plant when there is uncertainty concerning the initial outlay, or the option's time to maturity, or the cost of CO2 emission permits, or when there is a chance to double the plant size in the future. Our model comprises three sources of risk. We consider uncertain gas prices with regard to both the current level and the long-run equilibrium level; the current electricity price is also uncertain. They all are assumed to show mean reversion. The two-factor model for natural gas price is calibrated using data from NYMEX NG futures contracts. Also, we calibrate the one-factor model for electricity price using data from the Spanish wholesale electricity market, respectively. Then we use the estimated parameter values alongside actual physical parameters from a case study to value natural gas plants. Finally, the calibrated parameters are also used in a Monte Carlo simulation framework to evaluate several American-type options to invest in these energy assets. We accomplish this by following the least squares MC approach.

Profit and Cost in "Modern" Post-Marxian Profit Theory: A Case Study from Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics"

In this paper, I examine the treatment of competitive profit of professor Varian in his textbook on Microeconomics, as a representative of the “modern” post-Marxian view on competitive profit. I show how, on the one hand, Varian defines profit as the surplus of revenues over cost and, thus, as a part of the value of commodities that is not any cost. On the other hand, however, Varian defines profit as a cost, namely, as the opportunity cost of capital, so that, in competitive conditions, the profit or income of capital is determined by the opportunity cost of capital. I argue that this second definition contradicts the first and that it is based on an incoherent conception of opportunity cost.

Royalty Licensing

Published as an article in: Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 2, pages 284-287.

Profit as Cost versus Profit as Surplus over Cost: A Case Study on Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics"

On the analysis of Varian’s textbook on Microeconomics, which I take to be a representative of the standard view, I argue that Varian provides two contrary notions of profit, namely, profit as surplus over cost and profit as cost. Varian starts by defining profit as the surplus of revenues over cost and, thus, as the part of the value of commodities that is not any cost; however, he provides a second definition of profit as a cost, namely, as the opportunity cost of capital. I also argue that the definition of competitive profit as the opportunity cost of capital involves a self-contradictory notion of opportunity cost.

Roaming in the Mobile Internet: when coverage sharing agreements call for regulation

Revised: 2006-06

Growth in an oil abundant economy: The case of Venezuela

This paper has been presented at DEGIT-X held in México 2005.-- Revised: 2008-08.

Two-part tariff licensing mechanisms

Most of the patent licensing agreements that are observed include royalties, in particular per-unit or ad valorem royalties. This paper shows that in a differ entiated duopoly that competes á la Cournot the optimal contract for an internal patentee always includes a positive royalty. Moreover, we show that the patentee would prefer to use ad valorem royalties rather than per-unit royalties when goods are complements or when they are substitutes and the degree of differentiation is suffciently low. The reason is that by including an ad valorem royalty in the licensing contract the patentee can commit strategically to be more (less) aggressive when goods are complements (substitutes) since his licensing revenues become increasing with the price of output of his rival. As a result, licensing may hurt consumers although it always increases social welfare.

The Economics of Gasification: A Market-Based Approach

This paper deals with the economics of gasification facilities in general and IGCC power plants in particular. Regarding the prospects of these systems, passing the technological test is one thing, passing the economic test can be quite another. In this respect, traditional valuations assume constant input and/or output prices. Since this is hardly realistic, we allow for uncertainty in prices. We naturally look at the markets where many of the products involved are regularly traded. Futures markets on commodities are particularly useful for valuing uncertain future cash flows. Thus, revenues and variable costs can be assessed by means of sound financial concepts and actual market data. On the other hand, these complex systems provide a number of flexibility options (e.g., to choose among several inputs, outputs, modes of operation, etc.). Typically, flexibility contributes significantly to the overall value of real assets. Indeed, maximization of the asset value requires the optimal exercise of any flexibility option available. Yet the economic value of flexibility is elusive, the more so under (price) uncertainty. And the right choice of input fuels and/or output products is a main concern for the facility managers. As a particular application, we deal with the valuation of input flexibility. We follow the Real Options approach. In addition to economic variables, we also address technical and environmental issues such as energy efficiency, utility performance characteristics and emissions (note that carbon constraints are looming). Lastly, a brief introduction to some stochastic processes suitable for valuation purposes is provided.

Environmental fiscal reform and unemployment in Spain in the presence of an informal sector

4 p.

Competing Ecosystem services: an Assessment of Carbon and timber in the Tropical forests of Central America

4 p.

Competing Ecosystem Services: an Assessment of Carbon and Timber in the Tropical Forests of Central America

29 p.

From Shadow to Green: Linking Environmental Fiscal Reforms and the Informal Economy

47 p.

Effects of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage in Germany on European Electricity Exchange and Welfare

28 p.

Understanding Public Support for Externality-Correcting Taxes and Subsidies: A Lab Experiment

31 p.

The Green Paradox and Learning-by-doing in the Renewable Energy Sector

21 p.