Joan Robinson Was Almost Right: Output under Third-Degree Price Discrimination

In this paper, we show that in order for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output, the demands of the strong markets should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave than the demands of the weak markets. By making the distinction between adjusted concavity of the inverse demand and adjusted concavity of the direct demand, we are able to state necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output.

The New Keynesian Monetary Model: Does it Show the Comovement Between Output and Inflation in the U.S.?

Published as article in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2008), 32(May), pp. 1466-1488.

Optimal Monetary Policy with Asymmetric Preferences for Output

Using a model of an optimizing monetary authority which has preferences that weigh inflation and unemployment, Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) finds empirical evidence that the authority has asymmetric preferences for unemployment. We extend this model to weigh inflation and output and show that the empirical evidence using these series also supports an asymmetric preference hypothesis, only in our case, preferences are asymmetric for output. We also find evidence that the monetary authority targets potential output rather than some higher output level as would be the case in an extended Barro and Gordon (1983) model.

The Computer Input/Output Subsystem Education in an undergraduate introductory course: a Multiperspective Study

240 p.