Non-Stationary Demand in a Durable Goods Monopoly

In a context where demand for the services of a durable good changes over time, and this change may be uncertain, the paper shows that social welfare may be higher when the monopolist seller can commit to any future price level she wishes than when she cannot. Moreover, the equilibrium under a monopolist with commitment power may Pareto-dominate the equilibrium under a monopolist without commitment ability. These results affect the desired regulation of a durable goods monopolist in this context.

Should Fiscal Policy be different in a Non-Competitive Framework?

Published as an article in: Journal of Monetary Economics, 2003, vol. 50, issue 6, pages 1311-1331.

Entanglement negativity in the harmonic chain out of equilibrium

We study the entanglement in a chain of harmonic oscillators driven out of equilibrium by preparing the two sides of the system at different temperatures, and subsequently joining them together. The steady state is constructed explicitly and the logarithmic negativity is calculated between two adjacent segments of the chain. We find that, for low temperatures, the steady-state entanglement is a sum of contributions pertaining to left-and right-moving excitations emitted from the two reservoirs. In turn, the steady-state entanglement is a simple average of the Gibbs-state values and thus its scaling can be obtained from conformal field theory. A similar averaging behaviour is observed during the entire time evolution. As a particular case, we also discuss a local quench where both sides of the chain are initialized in their respective ground states.