Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature

Published as an article in: American Economic Review, 2010, vol. 100, issue 4, pages 1601-15.

Non-Stationary Demand in a Durable Goods Monopoly

In a context where demand for the services of a durable good changes over time, and this change may be uncertain, the paper shows that social welfare may be higher when the monopolist seller can commit to any future price level she wishes than when she cannot. Moreover, the equilibrium under a monopolist with commitment power may Pareto-dominate the equilibrium under a monopolist without commitment ability. These results affect the desired regulation of a durable goods monopolist in this context.

Monopoly price discrimination with constant elasticity demand

This paper presents new results on the welfare e¤ects of third-degree price discrimination under constant elasticity demand. We show that when both the share of the strong market under uniform pricing and the elasticity di¤erence between markets are high enough,then price discrimination not only can increase social welfare but also consumer surplus.

A Fundamental Contradiction in Standard Rent Theory: A Case Study on Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics"

In this paper, I examine Varian’s treatment of rent in his textbook on Microeconomics. I argue that he holds contradictory conceptions: sometimes rent is defined as surplus over cost whereas sometimes it is defined as cost, as the opportunity cost of fixed factors. I start by arguing that the distinction between fixed and variable factors is not the key for the definition of rent; ultimately, it is monopoly. Varian’s conception of rent is, essentially, Ricardo’s: rent is extraordinary profit turned rent. On the basis of a selfinconsistent notion of opportunity cost, Varian introduces the idea that rent is the opportunity cost of land, when what he actually defines is the opportunity cost of not renting the land. I also critically examine the related notion of “producer’s surplus”, and show that Varian’s treatment repeats the same contradiction as in rent.

Joan Robinson Was Almost Right: Output under Third-Degree Price Discrimination

In this paper, we show that in order for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output, the demands of the strong markets should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave than the demands of the weak markets. By making the distinction between adjusted concavity of the inverse demand and adjusted concavity of the direct demand, we are able to state necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output.

Endogenous Unions Formation

This paper analyzes the process of endogenous union formation in the context of a sequential bargaining model between a firm and several unions and tries to explain why workers may be represented by several unions of different sizes. We show that the equilibrium number of unions and their relative size depend on workers' attitudes toward the risk of unemployment and union configuration is independent of labor productivity.

Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).

Should Fiscal Policy be different in a Non-Competitive Framework?

Published as an article in: Journal of Monetary Economics, 2003, vol. 50, issue 6, pages 1311-1331.

Linajes urbanos y Parientes Mayores en Guipúzcoa a finales de la Edad Media (1450-1520)

[ES]Durante el tránsito de la Edad Media a la Edad Moderna los linajes urbanos y los Parientes Mayores siguieron compartiendo intereses comunes y estrechos lazos sanguíneos y económicos, que les permitieron monopolizar el poder de las villas guipuzcoanas y copar la mayor parte de los cargos concejiles, dando lugar a un proceso de oligarquización. El trabajo de investigación se vale de métodos prosopográficos para analizar una serie de fuentes inéditas o escasamente utilizadas hasta la fecha, complementadas por otras suficientemente conocidas, para demostrar que, a pesar de lo que ha venido manteniendo la historiografía, los Parientes Mayores no fueron vencidos y desplazados por los linajes urbanos, si no que se produjo una simbiosis entre ambos, lo que les permitió seguir controlando la vida política local y provincial de forma directa o indirecta.

Imperfect Competition

Para quien es de utilidad: •Alumnos de Tª Microeconómica IV, curso 3º LE. •Alumnos de las asignaturas de Tª de Juegos y Organización Industrial del Máster en Economía: Instrumentos del Análisis Económico. Estas notas sobre competencia imperfecta están dedicadas al estudio de estructuras de mercado caracterizadas por la existencia de poder de mercado. Se estudia en primer lugar el monopolio, dedicando una atención especial a los diferentes tipos de discriminación de precios. A continuación se presenta la Tª de juegos no cooperativos y se muestra su utilidad para analizar diferentes fenómenos económicos caracterizados por la interdependencia estratégica. Finalmente, se estudian diferentes modelos de competencia oligopolística y la estabilidad de los acuerdos colusivos.

Simple Coalitional Strategy Profiles in Repeated Games

This paper is a version of the discussion paper titled "Simple coalitional strategy profiles"

Countervailing incentives in adverse selection models. A synthesis

In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse selection problems. The key element in our characterization consists of analyzing properties of the full information problem. This allows solving the principal problem without using optimal control theory. Our methodology can also be applied to different economic settings: health economics, monopoly regulation, labour contracts, limited liabilities and environmental regulation.