Personal identity. A theoretical and experimental analysis

Published as article in: Journal of Economic Methodology, 2010, vol. 17, issue 3, pages 261-275.

Psicología Evolutiva y Psicología Evolucionista. Claves para la discusión

[Es] La teoría creacionista, universalmente en vigor antes de Darwin (y aún hoy sostenida por más de uno) sostenía que había habido una mente (divina), encargada de diseñar al hombre; que le puso ojos para que viera, oídos, mente para que pensara...Desde Darwin, por el contrario, se opina que la necesidad de enfrentarse a problemas diversos hizo que la mente fuera diversificándose, a través de sucesivas selecciones de las mentes más adaptativas. Según esto: 1.-¿Existen maquinarias biológicas “especializadas” en nuestro cerebro?. Y si existieran, 2.-¿Se desarrollan de forma espontánea?; es decir, sin esfuerzo ni instrucción formal? 3.-¿Se despliegan de forma inconsciente, autónoma y similar en todos los seres humanos? En definitiva: ¿Existe algo (facultad psicológica, órgano mental, sistema neurológico, módulo computacional…) que permita decir que las personas saben esto… o aquello… en el mismo sentido que las arañas saben tejer o los pájaros construir sus nidos?

A genealogical map of the concept of habit

The notion of information processing has dominated the study of the mind for over six decades. However, before the advent of cognitivism, one of the most prominent theoretical ideas was that of Habit. This is a concept with a rich and complex history, which is again starting to awaken interest, following recent embodied, enactive critiques of computationalist frameworks. We offer here a very brief history of the concept of habit in the form of a genealogical network-map. This serves to provide an overview of the richness of this notion and as a guide for further re-appraisal. We identify 77 thinkers and their influences, and group them into seven schools of thought. Two major trends can be distinguished. One is the associationist trend, starting with the work of Locke and Hume, developed by Hartley, Bain, and Mill to be later absorbed into behaviorism through pioneering animal psychologists (Morgan and Thorndike). This tradition conceived of habits atomistically and as automatisms (a conception later debunked by cognitivism). Another historical trend we have called organicism inherits the legacy of Aristotle and develops along German idealism, French spiritualism, pragmatism, and phenomenology. It feeds into the work of continental psychologists in the early 20th century, influencing important figures such as Merleau-Ponty, Piaget, and Gibson. But it has not yet been taken up by mainstream cognitive neuroscience and psychology. Habits, in this tradition, are seen as ecological, self-organizing structures that relate to a web of predispositions and plastic dependencies both in the agent and in the environment. In addition, they are not conceptualized in opposition to rational, volitional processes, but as transversing a continuum from reflective to embodied intentionality. These are properties that make habit a particularly attractive idea for embodied, enactive perspectives, which can now re-evaluate it in light of dynamical systems theory and complexity research.

An enactive and dynamical systems theory account of dyadic relationships

Many social relationships are a locus of struggle and suffering, either at the individual or interactional level. In this paper we explore why this is the case and suggest a modeling approach for dyadic interactions and the well-being of the participants. To this end we bring together an enactive approach to self with dynamical systems theory. Our basic assumption is that the quality of any social interaction or relationship fundamentally depends on the nature and constitution of the individuals engaged in these interactions. From an enactive perspective the self is conceived as an embodied and socially enacted autonomous system striving to maintain an identity. This striving involves a basic two-fold goal: the ability to exist as an individual in one's own right, while also being open to and affected by others. In terms of dynamical systems theory one can thus consider the individual self as a self-other organized system represented by a phase space spanned by the dimensions of distinction and participation, where attractors can be defined. Based on two everyday examples of dyadic relationship we propose a simple model of relationship dynamics, in which struggle or well-being in the dyad is analyzed in terms of movements of dyadic states that are in tension or in harmony with individually developed attractors. Our model predicts that relationships can be sustained when the dyad develops a new joint attractor toward which dyadic states tend to move, and well-being when this attractor is in balance with the individuals' attractors. We outline how this can inspire research on psychotherapy. The psychotherapy process itself provides a setting that supports clients to become aware how they fare with regards to the two-fold norm of distinction and participation and develop, through active engagement between client (or couple) and therapist, strategies to co-negotiate their self-organization.