Career Planning in Spain: Do temporary contracts delay marriage and motherhood?

The aim of this paper is to find an empirical connection between the impressive increase in the use of temporary contracts in Spain and the observed increase in age at marriage and maternity. Using a pool of the six available waves of individual information from the European Household Panel for Spain, we find that holding temporary contracts rather than permanent ones delays marriage for males, but not for females. Concerning maternity, the labor market situation of both members of the household affects entry into motherhood. In particular, if woman has a temporary contract rather than a permanent one, motherhoods is delayed independently of the husband's contract. As expected, postponement of maternity is not found for non-working women. These results give strong support to the career planning, motive to delay maternity in Spain, given that an unstable labor market situation of female workers is found to be the main deterrent to entry into motherhood.

Moral cleansing and moral licenses: experimental evidence

Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).