The Importance of Stock Market Returns in Estimated Monetary Policy Rules: a Structural Approach

This paper estimates a standard version of the New Keynesian Monetary (NKM) model augmented with financial variables in order to analyze the relative importance of stock market returns and term spread in the estimated U.S. monetary policy rule. The estimation procedure implemented is a classical structural method based on the indirect inference principle. The empirical results show that the Fed seems to respond to the macroeconomic outlook and to the stock market return but does not seem to respond to the term spread. Moreover, policy inertia and persistent policy shocks are also significant features of the estimated policy rule.

On the strategic equivalence of multiple-choice test scoring rules

A disadvantage of multiple-choice tests is that students have incentives to guess. To discourage guessing, it is common to use scoring rules that either penalize wrong answers or reward omissions. These scoring rules are considered equivalent in psychometrics, although experimental evidence has not always been consistent with this claim. We model students' decisions and show, first, that equivalence holds only under risk neutrality and, second, that the two rules can be modified so that they become equivalent even under risk aversion. This paper presents the results of a field experiment in which we analyze the decisions of subjects taking multiple-choice exams. The evidence suggests that differences between scoring rules are due to risk aversion as theory predicts. We also find that the number of omitted items depends on the scoring rule, knowledge, gender and other covariates.

Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).

Apuntes jurídicos sobre el paisaje lingüístico en Euskal Herria

This paper is a study of place-names and signs in the Basque Country from the point of view of language law. These are matters that relate to both the status and corpus of language and contribute to the formation of the language landscape,» After a brief historical introduction, the author focuses on the factors that bear on signs and the language 1andscape: the cornpetence factor and the language factor. The description of the latter leads the author to a discussion of the existing language system, in which the Spanish and Basque sharing official status does not necessarily entail the obligation to use both languages at the same time. Using this discussion as a frame of reference, the au- thor analyses place-names, traffic signals and signs. As for place-names, the existing rules are deemed rigid and lacking in ambition, in that they do not pursue the dissemination of official Basque forms. In traffic signaIs, Basque has to appear alongside Spanish, which is required by Spanish legislation, although this bilingualism excludes place-names that have an official Basque form only. With regard to signs, the author analyses public premises, companies licensed to provide public services and the private sector. For public premises there is no specific regulation, but the status of Basque as an autochthonous language, together with the identification and informatíon purposes of signs, could support the exclusive use of this language, According to the author , companies licensed to provide public services should observe the same language system as the goverment and therefore promote the use of Basque. Finally, in the private sector, the author upholds the legitimacy of measures to promote Basque language use such as tax allowances and exemptions in advertising and commercial signs.

La consommation du vin en Grèce ancienne: idéalisation et réalité

Forma parte del dossier "Penser les banquets grec et romain, Entre représentations et pratiques". Actes de la table ronde Le banquet dans l'Antiquité 6 janvier 2007, Institut national d'histoire de l'art - Paris. Coordinado por Robin Nadeau

Consumption and portfolio rules whit stochastic hyperbolic discounting

We extend the classic Merton (1969, 1971) problem that investigates the joint consumption-savings and portfolio-selection problem under capital risk by assuming sophisticated but time-inconsistent agents. We introduce stochastic hyperbolic preferences as in Harris and Laibson (2013) and find closed-form solutions for Merton's optimal consumption and portfolio selection problem in continuous time. We find that the portfolio rule remains identical to the time-consistent solution with power utility and no borrowing constraints. However,the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is unambiguously greater than the time-consistent, exponential case and,importantly, it is also more responsive to changes in risk. These results suggest that hyperbolic discounting with sophisticated agents offers promise for contributing to explaining important aspects of asset market data.

Preferences, actions and voting rules

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for "manipulability" (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining

We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the effects of decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.

On the Benefits of Including Age-structure in Harvest Control Rules

This paper explores the benefits of including age-structure in the control rule (HCR) when decision makers regard their (age-structured) models as approximations. We find that introducing age structure into the HCR reduces both the volatility of the spawning biomass and the yield. Although at a fairly imprecise level the benefits are lower, there are still major advantages for actual assessment precision of the case study. Moreover, we find that when age-structure is included in the HCR the relative ranking of different policies in terms of variance in biomass and yield does not differ. These results are shown both theoretically and numerically by applying the model to the Southern Hake fishery.

Intermediate serial cost-sharing rules

In this paper we give a generalization of the serial cost-sharing rule defined by Moulin and Shenker (1992) for cost sharing problems. According to the serial cost sharing rule, agents with low demands of a good pay cost increments associated with low quantities in the production process of that good. This fact might not always be desirable for those agents, since those cost increments might be higher than others, for example with concave cost functions. In this paper we give a family of cost sharing rules which allocates cost increments in all the possible places in the production process. And we characterize axiomatically each of them by means of an axiomatic characterization related to the one given for the serial cost-sharing rule by Moulin and Shenker (1994).

A common axiom for classical division rules for claims problems

In this paper we introduce a new axiom, denoted claims separability, that is satisfied by several classical division rules defined for claims problems. We characterize axiomatically the entire family of division rules that satisfy this new axiom. In addition, employing claims separability, we characterize the minimal overlap rule, given by O'Neill (1982), Piniles rule and the rules in the TAL-family, introduced by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006), which includes the uniform gains rule, the uniform losses rule and the Talmud rule.