Design, Construction and Testing of a Hydraulic Power Take-Off for Wave Energy Converters

This paper presents the construction, mathematical modeling and testing of a scaled universal hydraulic Power Take-Off (PTO) device for Wave Energy Converters (WECs). A specific prototype and test bench were designed and built to carry out the tests. The results obtained from these tests were used to adjust an in-house mathematical model. The PTO was initially designed to be coupled to a scaled wave energy capture device with a low speed and high torque oscillating motion and high power fluctuations. Any Energy Capture Device (ECD) that fulfils these requirements can be coupled to this PTO, provided that its scale is adequately defined depending on the rated power of the full scale prototype. The initial calibration included estimation of the pressure drops in the different components, the pressurization time of the oil inside the hydraulic cylinders and the volumetric efficiency of the complete circuit. Since the overall efficiency measured during the tests ranged from 0.69 to 0.8 and the dynamic performance of the PTO was satisfactory, the results are really promising and it is believed that this solution might prove effective in real devices.

Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction

In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might simply unexpectedly forget what they previously observed (but not chose). Following this idea, this paper drops the assumption that the information structure of extensive-form games is commonly known; that is, it introduces uncertainty into players' capacity to observe each others' past choices. Using this approach, our main result provides the following epistemic characterisation: if players (i) are rational,(ii) have strong belief in both opponents' rationality and opponents' capacity to observe others' choices, and (iii) have common belief in both opponents' future rationality and op-ponents' future capacity to observe others' choices, then the backward induction outcome obtains. Consequently, we do not require perfect information, and players observing each others' choices is often irrelevant from a strategic point of view. The analysis extends {from generic games with perfect information to games with not necessarily perfect information{the work by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Perea (2014), who provide different sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome.