2 resultados para LEGISLATIVE BODIES
em Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación - Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad del País Vasco
Resumo:
[EN] This paper focuses on how to initiate discussions of the regulatory gaze in primary school classrooms through the study of characters in literature. It specifically focuses on two renowned characters in Spanish literature: Xola (Bernardo Atxaga) and Iholdi (Mariasun Landa). These characters are composed of a chorus of looks which in turn also look. We shall carefully reflect upon these looks and discuss how we see others, how others see us, and how we would like others to see us.
Resumo:
We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the effects of decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.