R&D Policy in Economies with Endogenous Growth and Non-Renewable Resources

The aim of this paper is to analyze how active R&D policies affect the growth rate of an economy with endogenous growth and non-renewable resources. We know from Scholz and Ziemens (1999) and Groth (2006) that in infinitely lived agents (ILA) economies, any active R&D policy increases the growth rate of the economy. To see if this result also appears in economies with finite lifetime agents, we developed an endogenous growth overlapping generations (OLG) economy à la Diamond which uses non-renewable resources as essential inputs in final good’s production. We show analytically that any R&D policy that reduces the use of natural resources implies a raise in the growth rate of the economy. Numerically we show that in economies with low intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), active R&D policies lead the economy to increase the depletion of non-renewable resources. Nevertheless, we find that active R&D policies always imply increases in the endogenous growth rate, in both scenarios. Furthermore, when the IES coefficient is lower (greater) than one, active R&D policies affect the growth rate of the economy in the ILA more (less) than in OLG economies.

Growth in Overlapping Generation Economies with Non-Renewable Resources

Published as an article in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2005, vol. 50, issue 2, pages 387-407.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker notion, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probabilities p = (pi)i2I or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a constrained correlated equilibrium of a doubled game satisfying certain p-belief constraints and characterize the topological structure of the resulting set of p-rational outcomes. We establish continuity in the parameters p and show that, for p su ciently close to one, the p-rational outcomes are close to the correlated equilibria and, with high probability, supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend Aumann and Dreze's [4] theorem on rational expectations of interim types to the broader p-rational belief systems, and also discuss the case of non-common priors.

Sentido común y "shared knowledge" en el doblaje cinematográfico

Santamaría, José Miguel; Pajares, Eterio; Olsen, Vickie; Merino, Raquel; Eguíluz, Federico (eds.)