Policy Coordination in an Oligopolistic Housing Market

This paper analyzes the consequences of the interaction between two different levels of government (regulators) in the development of housing policy when their decisions determine the level of competition in the housing market. The analysis discusses the implications derived from a lack of coordination between a local regulator who controls the supply of land for housing development and a central regulator who decides on housing subsidies. The results suggest that lack of coordination has significant effects on prices and supply of houses, housing developers’ profits, and buyers’ surplus.

Ad valorem housing subsidies may reduce house building

In this paper it is shown that an ad valorem housing subsidy set by a central regulator (or a raise in the ad valorem housing subsidy rate) may reduce the number of houses built in the market and increase the price paid by the buyers of houses. The analysis considers a situation where there is imperfect competition in the housing market and a local regulator that decides on density, or on the number of sites for housing development, and that cares about a combination of the profits of housing developers and the surplus of buyers of houses.

Social Housing under Oligopoly

In this paper it is shown that the setting up of a social housing system may decrease the total number of houses built in the market, induce a price of non-social houses greater than the price of houses without that system and increase the profits of housing developers even in situations where they have to sell social houses at a price below production cost. The analysis considers a situation with imperfect competition in the housing market and with a social housing system where housing developers must provide some social houses when they obtain a permit to build non-social houses.

Decomposing the Gender Wage Gap: The effect of firms, occupations and Job Stratification

This paper presents new evidence on the role of segregation into firms, occupations within a firm and stratification into professional categories within firm-occupations in explaining the gender wage gap. I use a generalized earnings model that allows observed and unobserved group characteristics to have different impact on wages of men and women within the same group. The database is a large sample of individual wage data from the 1995 Spanish Wage Structure Survey. Results indicate that firm segregation in our sample accounts for around one-fifth of the raw gender wage gap. Occupational segregation within firms accounts for about one-third of the raw wage gap, and stratification into different professional categories within firms and occupations explains another one-third of it. The remaining one-fifth of the overall gap arises from better outcomes of men relative to women within professional categories. It is also found that rewards to both observable and unobservable skills, particularly those related to education, are higher for males than for females within the same group. Finally, mean wages in occupations or job categories with a higher fraction of female co-workers are lower, but the negative impact of femaleness in higher for women.

Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis

We consider a job contest in which candidates go through interviews (cheap talk) and are subject to reference checks. We show how competitive pressure - increasing the ratio of "good" to "bad" type candi- dates - can lead to a vast increase in lying and in some cases make bad hires more likely. As the number of candidates increases, it becomes harder to in- duce truth-telling. The interview stage becomes redundant if the candidates, a priori, know each others' type or the result of their own reference check. Finally, we show that the employer can bene t from committing not to reject all the applicants.

El desarrollo rural en la vertiente atlántica del País Vasco: un balance

[EUS] Artikulo honetan euskal isurialde atlantiarreko bi munitzipioetan martxan jarritako garapen lokaleko proiektuak aztertzen dira. Esperientzia horiek beherapen industrialean dagoen eskualde batean landa garapenak izan dezakeen egokitasunari buruz pentsatzera bultzatzen dute.

Balance de la política fiscal desarrollada en España en época de crisis. ¿Por qué elegir el camino contractivo?

The use of a contractive fiscal policy in times of crisis and austerity can lead to so many different opinion streams which can be, at the same time, very opposite with each other. The high budget deficit in some economies has forced the eurozone to implement austerity policies, meaning that the debate is now more alive than ever. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of the implementation of a contractive policy during a crisis considering the case of Spain. The positive effects in financial markets were noticed due to the decrease of the risk premium and the payment of interests, and also thanks to the increase of trust towards Spain. This way, the reduction of the Spanish deficit was remarkable but in any case there is still a long path until reaching the limit of 3% of the GDP. Also, in the short run it is possible to see that the consolidation had contractive effects in the economic activity but, in the long run, the debate is among the defenders of the fact that austerity is followed by a growing period and the ones opposing to it due to the drowning effect produced by it.

Analysis of the housing market in the autonomous community of the Basque country: the adjustment after the burst of the housing bubble

In this project study the characteristic and dynamics of the residential housing market in the Basque country. When strong expansion and colapsing emerged in 2007,studied the differents adjustment.

Energy retrofits in social housing. Analysis of its thermal behaviour.

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