RCeveierwamide and ceramide 1-phosphate in health and disease

Sphingolipids are essential components of cell membranes, and many of them regulate vital cell functions. In particular, ceramide plays crucial roles in cell signaling processes. Two major actions of ceramides are the promotion of cell cycle arrest and the induction of apoptosis. Phosphorylation of ceramide produces ceramide 1-phosphate (C1P), which has opposite effects to ceramide. C1P is mitogenic and has prosurvival properties. In addition, C1P is an important mediator of inflammatory responses, an action that takes place through stimulation of cytosolic phospholipase A2, and the subsequent release of arachidonic acid and prostaglandin formation. All of the former actions are thought to be mediated by intracellularly generated C1P. However, the recent observation that C1P stimulates macrophage chemotaxis implicates specific plasma membrane receptors that are coupled to Gi proteins. Hence, it can be concluded that C1P has dual actions in cells, as it can act as an intracellular second messenger to promote cell survival, or as an extracellular receptor agonist to stimulate cell migration.

Moral cleansing and moral licenses: experimental evidence

Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).