Turnout Intention and Social Networks

How can networking affect the turnout in an election? We present a simple model to explain turnout as a result of a dynamic process of formation of the intention to vote within Erdös-Renyi random networks. Citizens have fixed preferences for one of two parties and are embedded in a given social network. They decide whether or not to vote on the basis of the attitude of their immediate contacts. They may simply follow the behavior of the majority (followers) or make an adaptive local calculus of voting (Downsian behavior). So they either have the intention of voting when the majority of their neighbors are willing to vote too, or they vote when they perceive in their social neighborhood that elections are "close". We study the long run average turnout, interpreted as the actual turnout observed in an election. Depending on the combination of values of the two key parameters, the average connectivity and the probability of behaving as a follower or in a Downsian fashion, the system exhibits monostability (zero turnout), bistability (zero turnout and either moderate or high turnout) or tristability (zero, moderate and high turnout). This means, in particular, that for a wide range of values of both parameters, we obtain realistic turnout rates, i.e. between 50% and 90%.

To appove or not to approve: this is not the only question

This paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can express neither a negative opinion nor an opinion on more than one candidate. Approval voting partially fills this gap by asking an opinion on all candidates. Still the choice is only between approval and non approval. However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of suffcient knowledge for approving the candidate. In this paper we characterize the dis&approval voting rule, a natural extension of approval voting that distinguishes between indifference and disapproval.

Abstention, null and blank votes in the Basque Autonomous Community

The objectives of this essay are twofold. First it reviews the reason for abstaining (or casting a null or blank vote) in elections. It also provides the data of abstention in the elections to the European Parliament. Fewer data are available on blank and null votes. These are provided for some countries. The second objective is to analyze the data of the elections in the Basque Autonomous Community since 1977. The evolution through time is commented. The main features are the low participation in the European elections on the one hand and the importance of the null vote in the 2003-2009 period.

Abstention, null and blank votes in the Basque Autonomous Community

The objectives of this essay are twofold. First it reviews the reason for abstaining (or casting a null or blank vote) in elections. It also provides the data of abstention in the elections to the European Parliament. Fewer data are available on blank and null votes. These are provided for some countries. The second objective is to analyze the data of the elections in the Basque Autonomous Community since 1977. The evolution through time is commented. The main features are the low participation in the European elections on the one hand and the importance of the null vote in the 2003-2009 period.

Ghost seats in the Basque Parliament

In elections voters have generally four options: to abstain, to cast a blank vote, to cast a null vote, or to vote for a candidate or party. This last option is a positive expression of support, while the other three options reflect lack of interest, or dissatisfaction with the parties or the political system. However only votes for parties or candidates are taken into account in the apportionment method. In particular the number of seats allocated to parties remains constant even if the number of non votes (i.e. blank votes, null votes or abstention) is very large. This paper proposes to treat the non votes as a party in the apportionment method and to leave empty the corresponding seats. These empty seats are referred to as "ghost seats". How this would affect the decision-making is quantified in terms of power indices. We apply this proposal to a case study:the regional Parliament of the Basque Autonomous Community (Spain) from 1980 till 2012.