Cost-Saving production technologies and strategic delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms that produce a differentiated good can choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the latter. By giving managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we find that Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology than the strict profit maximization case. However, the results may be reversed under Cournot competition. We show that if the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently low (high), the incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology is larger under strict profit maximization (strategic delegation).

Contributions on agreement in dynamic distributed systems

139 p.

On the study of train-track dynamic interactions caused by rail welds on discrete supported rails

The paper studies the influence of rail weld dip on wheel-rail contact dynamics, with particular reference to freight trains where it is important to increase the operating speed and also the load transported. This has produced a very precise model, albeit simple and cost-effective, which has enabled train-track dynamic interactions over rail welds to be studied to make it possible to quantify the influence on dynamic forces and displacements of the welding geometry; of the position of the weld relative to the sleeper; of the vehicle's speed; and of the axle load and wheelset unsprung mass. It is a vertical model on the spatial domain and is drawn up in a simple fashion from vertical track receptances. For the type of track and vehicle used, the results obtained enable the quantification of increases in wheel-rail contact forces due to the new speed and load conditions.