13 resultados para Diodati, Giovanni, 1576-1649.
em Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación - Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad del País Vasco
Resumo:
The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometimes, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, even when coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.
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This paper explores the role of social integration on altruistic behavior. To this aim, we develop a two-stage experimental protocol based on the classic Dictator Game. In the first stage, we ask a group of 77 undergraduate students in Economics to elicit their social network; in the second stage, each of them has to unilaterally decide over the division of a fixed amount of money to be shared with another anonymous member in the group. Our experimental design allows to control for other variables known to be relevant for altruistic behavior: framing and friendship/acquaintance relations. Consistently with previous research, we find that subjects favor their friends and that framing enhances altruistic behavior. Once we control for these effects, social integration (measured by betweenness, a standard centrality measure in network theory) has a positive effect on giving: the larger social isolation within the group, the more likely it is the emergence of selfish behavior. These results suggest that information on the network structure in which subjects are embedded is crucial to account for their behavior.
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In this study we define a cost sharing rule for cost sharing problems. This rule is related to the serial cost-sharing rule defined by Moulin and Shenker (1992). We give some formulas and axiomatic characterizations for the new rule. The axiomatic characterizations are related to some previous ones provided by Moulin and Shenker (1994) and Albizuri (2010).
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Este artículo estudia las demandas presentadas por empresas multinacionales contra estados latinoamericanos en instancias internacionales de arbitraje. Como esas demandas derivan de la suscripción de numerosos acuerdos internacionales sobre inversión, se plantean los límites que para la puesta en práctica de estrategias de desarrollo suponen dichos acuerdos. Luego se repasan las respuestas dadas por varios países de la región a fin de superar el obstáculo que esas demandas suponen, considerándolas insuficientes. Como alternativa, se propone retomar la doctrina Calvo, recuperando la soberanía jurisdiccional de cada estado.
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We provide empirical evidence to support the claims that social diversity promotes prosocial behavior. We elicit a real-life social network and its members’ adherence to a social norm, namely inequity aversion. The data reveal a positive relationship between subjects’ prosociality and several measures of centrality. This result is in line with the theoretical literature that relates the evolution of social norms to the structure of social interactions and argues that central individuals are crucial for the emergence of prosocial behavior.
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Anejos de Veleia, Series Minor, 26. Editado por Vitalino Valcárcel.
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We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M stable set and otherwise they have infinite sets.
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Background: Type-1 cannabinoid receptors (CB1R) are enriched in the hypothalamus, particularly in the ventromedial hypothalamic nucleus (VMH) that participates in homeostatic and behavioral functions including food intake. Although CB1R activation modulates excitatory and inhibitory synaptic transmission in the brain, CB1R contribution to the molecular architecture of the excitatory and inhibitory synaptic terminals in the VMH is not known. Therefore, the aim of this study was to investigate the precise subcellular distribution of CB1R in the VMH to better understand the modulation exerted by the endocannabinoid system on the complex brain circuitries converging into this nucleus. Methodology/Principal Findings: Light and electron microscopy techniques were used to analyze CB1R distribution in the VMH of CB1R-WT, CB1R-KO and conditional mutant mice bearing a selective deletion of CB1R in cortical glutamatergic (Glu-CB1R-KO) or GABAergic neurons (GABA-CB1R-KO). At light microscopy, CB1R immunolabeling was observed in the VMH of CB1R-WT and Glu-CB1R-KO animals, being remarkably reduced in GABA-CB1R-KO mice. In the electron microscope, CB1R appeared in membranes of both glutamatergic and GABAergic terminals/preterminals. There was no significant difference in the percentage of CB1R immunopositive profiles and CB1R density in terminals making asymmetric or symmetric synapses in CB1R-WT mice. Furthermore, the proportion of CB1R immunopositive terminals/preterminals in CB1R-WT and Glu-CB1R-KO mice was reduced in GABA-CB1R-KO mutants. CB1R density was similar in all animal conditions. Finally, the percentage of CB1R labeled boutons making asymmetric synapses slightly decreased in Glu-CB1R-KO mutants relative to CB1R-WT mice, indicating that CB1R was distributed in cortical and subcortical excitatory synaptic terminals. Conclusions/Significance: Our anatomical results support the idea that the VMH is a relevant hub candidate in the endocannabinoid-mediated modulation of the excitatory and inhibitory neurotransmission of cortical and subcortical pathways regulating essential hypothalamic functions for the individual's survival such as the feeding behavior.
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In this paper we give a generalization of the serial cost-sharing rule defined by Moulin and Shenker (1992) for cost sharing problems. According to the serial cost sharing rule, agents with low demands of a good pay cost increments associated with low quantities in the production process of that good. This fact might not always be desirable for those agents, since those cost increments might be higher than others, for example with concave cost functions. In this paper we give a family of cost sharing rules which allocates cost increments in all the possible places in the production process. And we characterize axiomatically each of them by means of an axiomatic characterization related to the one given for the serial cost-sharing rule by Moulin and Shenker (1994).
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In this paper we introduce a new axiom, denoted claims separability, that is satisfied by several classical division rules defined for claims problems. We characterize axiomatically the entire family of division rules that satisfy this new axiom. In addition, employing claims separability, we characterize the minimal overlap rule, given by O'Neill (1982), Piniles rule and the rules in the TAL-family, introduced by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006), which includes the uniform gains rule, the uniform losses rule and the Talmud rule.
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In this paper we introduce a new cost sharing rule-the minimal overlap cost sharing rule-which is associated with the minimal overlap rule for claims problems defined by O'Neill (1982). An axiomatic characterization is given by employing a unique axiom: demand separability. Variations of this axiom enable the serial cost sharing rule (Moulin and Shenker, 1992) and the rules of a family (Albizuri, 2010) that generalize the serial cost sharing rule to be characterized. Finally, a family that includes the minimal overlap cost sharing rule is defined and obtained by means of an axiomatic characterization.
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Hart and Mas Colell (1989) introduce the potential function for cooperative TU games. In this paper, we extend this approach to claims problems, also known as bankruptcy or rationing problems. We show that for appropriate subproblems, the random arrival rule, the rules in the TAL-family (which include the uniform gains rule, the uniform losses rule and the Talmud rule), the minimal overlap rule, and the proportional rule admit a potential. We also study the balanced contributions property for these rules. By means of a potential, we introduce a generalization of the random arrival rule and mixtures of the minimal overlap rule and the uniform losses rule.
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En los últimos años, algunos países emergentes como China, India y Brasil, han experimentado importantes avances en el área de la innovación científicotecnológica. En este artículo se realiza una primera aproximación a los dilemas éticos que se plantean entre los diversos paradigmas-científico tecnológicos y la mejora del bienestar de la población en estos países. Se evalúan los diversos tipos de conocimiento (patentes y derechos de propiedad intelectual, conocimiento tradicional, innovaciones de base social e innovaciones inclusivas) en función de criterios que tienen que ver con su base local, los objetivos que persiguen y los valores relacionados con esos objetivos. Para los países de renta media y baja, las innovaciones de base social y las innovaciones inclusivas podrían favorecer en mayor medida la mejora del bienestar de sus poblaciones.