The Black Box of Mutual Fund Fees

This paper re-examines the determinants of mutual fund fees paid by mutual fund shareholders for management costs and other expenses. There are two novelties with respect to previous studies. First, each type of fee is explained separately. Second, the paper employs a new dataset consisting of Spanish mutual funds, making it the second paper to study mutual fund fees outside the US market. Furthermore, the Spanish market has three interesting characteristics: (i) both distribution and management are highly dominated by banks and savings banks, which points towards potential conflicts of interest; (ii) Spanish mutual fund law imposes caps on all types of fees; and (iii) Spain ranks first in terms of average mutual fund fees among similar countries. We find significant differences in mutual fund fees not explained by the fund’s investment objective. For instance, management companies owned by banks and savings banks charge higher management fees and redemption fees to nonguaranteed funds. Also, investors in older non-guaranteed funds and non-guaranteed funds with a lower average investment are more likely to end up paying higher management fees. Moreover, there is clear evidence that some mutual funds enjoy better conditions from custodial institutions than others. In contrast to evidence from the US market, larger funds are not associated with lower fees, but with higher custody fees for guaranteed funds and higher redemption fees for both types of funds. Finally, fee-setting by mutual funds is not related to fund before-fee performance.

La inversión socialmente responsable en los fondos de pensiones y en las EPSV de empleo

Máster en Dirección Empresarial desde la Innovación y la internacionalización. Curso 2013/2014

A dynamic CGE modelling approach for analyzing trade-offs in climate change policy options: the case of Green Climate Fund

38 p.

The Spanish corporate structure through interlocking directorates

[EN] The aim of this paper is to determine to what extent globalization pressures are changing interlocking directorate networks modeled on continental capitalism into Anglo-Saxon models. For this purpose we analyse the Spanish network of interlocks, comparing the present structure (2012) with that of 1993 and 2006. We show how, although Spanish corporative structure continues to display characteristics of the continental economies, some major banks are significantly reducing industrial activity. Nevertheless, the financial organizations continue to maintain a close relationship with sectors such as construction and services. The analysis of the network of directorates shows a retreat in activity of industrial banking in Spain. Two large Spanish financial institutions, BSCH and La Caixa, continue to undertake activities of industrial banking in 2006, but this activity is significantly reduced in 2012. According to the theories on the role of the interlocking directorates, the companies in these sectors assure their access to banking credit by incorporating advisors from financial organizations to their board of directors. We cannot conclude that the structure of the Spanish corporate network has become a new case of Anglo-Saxon structure, but we got indications that are becoming less hierarchic as banks seem to slowly abandon centrality positions. This is especially salient if we compare the networks of 2006 and 2012, which show a continuing decrease of the role of banks and insurance companies in the network.