The Impact of Regulation on Pricing Behavior in the Spanish Electricity Market

In this paper we measure the impact of regulatory measures which affected the Spanish electricity wholesale market in the period 2002-2005. Our approach is based on the fact that regulation changes firms' incentives and therefore their market behavior. In the absence of any regulation firms would choose profit- maximizing prices on their residual demands so that the observed gap between optimal and actual prices provides a measure of the effect of regulation. Our results indicate that regulation has decreased wholesale prices considerably, but became less effective at the end of the sample period which explains the change of regulatory regime introduced in 2006.

Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market

The paper has two major contributions to the theory of repeated games. First, we build a supergame oligopoly model where firms compete in supply functions, we show how collusion sustainability is affected by the presence of a convex cost function, the magnitude of both the slope of demand market, and the number of rivals. Then, we compare the results with those of the traditional Cournot reversion under the same structural characteristics. We find how depending on the number of firms and the slope of the linear demand, collusion sustainability is easier under supply function than under Cournot competition. The conclusions of the models are simulated with data from the Spanish wholesale electricity market to predict lower bounds of the discount factors.

Increased opioid dependence in a mouse model of panic disorder

[EN] Panic disorder is a highly prevalent neuropsychiatric disorder that shows co-occurrence with substance abuse. Here, we demonstrate that TrkC, the high-affinity receptor for neurotrophin-3, is a key molecule involved in panic disorder and opiate dependence, using a transgenic mouse model (TgNTRK3). Constitutive TrkC overexpression in TgNTRK3 mice dramatically alters spontaneous firing rates of locus coeruleus (LC) neurons and the response of the noradrenergic system to chronic opiate exposure, possibly related to the altered regulation of neurotrophic peptides observed. Notably, TgNTRK3 LC neurons showed an increased firing rate in saline-treated conditions and profound abnormalities in their response to met5-enkephalin. Behaviorally, chronic morphine administration induced a significantly increased withdrawal syndrome in TgNTRK3 mice. In conclusion, we show here that the NT-3/TrkC system is an important regulator of neuronal firing in LC and could contribute to the adaptations of the noradrenergic system in response to chronic opiate exposure. Moreover, our results indicate that TrkC is involved in the molecular and cellular changes in noradrenergic neurons underlying both panic attacks and opiate dependence and support a functional endogenous opioid deficit in panic disorder patients.

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

Role of G protein coupled inwardly rectifier K+ channels (GIRK) on the neurobiology depression

353 págs.

The effects of disorder in dimerized quantum magnets in mean field approximations

15 p.