A Note on Risk Acceptance, Bankruptcy Avoidance and Riskiness Measures

In this work we clarify the relationships between riskiness, risk acceptance and bankruptcy avoidance. We distinguish between the restriction on the current wealth required to make a gamble acceptable to the decision maker and the restriction on the current wealth required to guarantee no bankruptcy if a gamble is accepted. We focus on the measure of riskiness proposed by Foster and Hart.

Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game

The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a noncooperative game and solution concepts of cooperative games such as the nucleolus, kernel and the egalitarian core.

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

Instituciones Microfinancieras y banca tradicional: diferencias en funcionamiento y resultados durante la crisis

Español: A finales del 2007 muchas entidades financieras comenzaron a mostrar cifras negativas en sus balances y tras la quiebra de entidades de gran peso económico como el banco Lehman Brothers en Estados Unidos en septiembre del 2008, el mundo se ha visto envuelto en una crisis económica de la que parece no verse el final. Las entidades financieras tradicionales han centrado sus esfuerzos en obtener las mayores rentabilidades posibles, invirtiendo sus recursos en activos muy arriesgados, que si bien en un principio generaban beneficios muy elevados, a día de hoy han hecho quebrar muchas entidades a nivel mundial y han provocado la pérdida de los ahorros de muchos ciudadanos. Ajenas a esto se encuentran las entidades microfinancieras, que con un enfoque muy diferente al de la banca tradicional, se han centrado en proporcionar financiación a aquellos que dada su situación económica y falta de garantías no podían acudir al sector financiero tradicional. Tras realizar un análisis de los resultados de ambos modelos financieros desde 2006 hasta 2012, se ha podido comprobar como el sector microfinanciero presenta resultados más favorables y muestra una mayor prosperidad de cara al futuro. Por lo general, estas entidades mantienen niveles de solvencia más elevados y emplean todos sus recursos en proporcionar financiación a sus clientes. Finalmente, la solución a los problemas del sistema financiero tradicional se basa en un aumento de los niveles de capital de sus entidades, volviendo a un modelo de banca tradicional centrado en ofrecer financiación al público, con provisiones más liquidas y mayores garantías ante necesidades de liquidez como las retiradas masivas de depósitos recientemente sufridas.

A potential approach to claims problems

Hart and Mas Colell (1989) introduce the potential function for cooperative TU games. In this paper, we extend this approach to claims problems, also known as bankruptcy or rationing problems. We show that for appropriate subproblems, the random arrival rule, the rules in the TAL-family (which include the uniform gains rule, the uniform losses rule and the Talmud rule), the minimal overlap rule, and the proportional rule admit a potential. We also study the balanced contributions property for these rules. By means of a potential, we introduce a generalization of the random arrival rule and mixtures of the minimal overlap rule and the uniform losses rule.

The SD-prekernel for TU games

We introduce and analyze a new solution concept for TU games:The Surplus Distributor Prekernel. Like the prekermel, the new solu- tion is based on the an alternative motion of complaint of one player against other with respect to an allocation. The SD-prekernel contains the SD-prenucleolus and they coincide in the class of convex games. This result allows us to prove that in bankruptcy problems the SD-prekernel and the Minimal Overlapping rule select the same allocation.