Turnout Intention and Social Networks

How can networking affect the turnout in an election? We present a simple model to explain turnout as a result of a dynamic process of formation of the intention to vote within Erdös-Renyi random networks. Citizens have fixed preferences for one of two parties and are embedded in a given social network. They decide whether or not to vote on the basis of the attitude of their immediate contacts. They may simply follow the behavior of the majority (followers) or make an adaptive local calculus of voting (Downsian behavior). So they either have the intention of voting when the majority of their neighbors are willing to vote too, or they vote when they perceive in their social neighborhood that elections are "close". We study the long run average turnout, interpreted as the actual turnout observed in an election. Depending on the combination of values of the two key parameters, the average connectivity and the probability of behaving as a follower or in a Downsian fashion, the system exhibits monostability (zero turnout), bistability (zero turnout and either moderate or high turnout) or tristability (zero, moderate and high turnout). This means, in particular, that for a wide range of values of both parameters, we obtain realistic turnout rates, i.e. between 50% and 90%.

Asymmetric flow networks

This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark models by Bala and Goyal, the one-way flow model, and the two-way flow model, and includes both as particular extreme cases. As in both benchmark models, in what we call an "asymmetric flow" network a link can be initiated unilaterally by any player with any other, and the flow through a link towards the player who supports it is perfect. Unlike those models, in the opposite direction there is friction or decay. When this decay is complete there is no flow and this corresponds to the one-way flow model. The limit case when the decay in the opposite direction (and asymmetry) disappears, corresponds to the two-way flow model. We characterize stable and strictly stable architectures for the whole range of parameters of this "intermediate" and more general model. We also prove the convergence of Bala and Goyal's dynamic model in this context.

Prosocial norms and degree heterogeneity in social networks

We provide empirical evidence to support the claims that social diversity promotes prosocial behavior. We elicit a real-life social network and its members’ adherence to a social norm, namely inequity aversion. The data reveal a positive relationship between subjects’ prosociality and several measures of centrality. This result is in line with the theoretical literature that relates the evolution of social norms to the structure of social interactions and argues that central individuals are crucial for the emergence of prosocial behavior.

Communities in complex networks

The study of complex networks has attracted the attention of the scientific community for many obvious reasons. A vast number of systems, from the brain to ecosystems, power grid, and the Internet, can be represented as large complex networks, i.e, assemblies of many interacting components with nontrivial topological properties. The link between these components can describe a global behaviour such as the Internet traffic, electricity supply service, market trend, etc. One of the most relevant topological feature of graphs representing these complex systems is community structure which aims to identify the modules and, possibly, their hierarchical organization, by only using the information encoded in the graph topology. Deciphering network community structure is not only important in order to characterize the graph topologically, but gives some information both on the formation of the network and on its functionality.

Forward-looking Pairwise Stability in Networks with Externalities

We consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation rule. Players discount the future by a common factor. The pair formed by an allocation rule and a transition probability matrix is called a forward-looking network formation scheme if, first, the probability that a link is created is positive if the discounted, expected gains to its two participants are positive, and if, second, the probability that a link is eliminated is positive if the discounted, expected gains to at least one of its two participants are positive. The main result is the existence, for all discount factors and all value functions, of a forward-looking network formation scheme. Furthermore, we can always nd a forward-looking network formation scheme such that (i) the allocation rule is component balanced and (ii) the transition probabilities increase in the di erence in payo s for the corresponding players responsible for the transition. We use this dynamic solution concept to explore the tension between e ciency and stability.